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ABSTRACT
This study examines the terms and conditions found in the 67 Florida public school
collective bargaining agreements. Such collective bargaining agreements are negotiated between
two parties, the teacher unions and their employers, under Florida Statute 447. The purpose of
this mixed-methods study, conducted using both qualitative and quantitative research methods, is
as follows: 1) to determine the extent to which CBA provisions exist within the master contracts
of Florida teachers (2016-2017) and; 2) to determine the extent to which, if any, collective
bargaining provisions vary among school districts (i.e. district size, district performance, district
locale). The study finds that none of the eight desirable provisions were present in all 66
collective bargaining agreements indicating that collective bargaining agreements vary in terms
of the inclusion of desirable provisions for teachers. The study also finds that that spatial
relationship plays a role in determining bargaining outcomes. The results of this study provide
insight into the terms and conditions of collective bargaining agreements in Florida; thereby
providing Florida school districts with information to construct the best possible competitive
contracts in the future, which would then attract top talent as well as to protect the best interests
of their districts.

i

For Myself, Doris, Stuart, Corey, and Bella

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my advisor and committee chair, Dr. RoSusan D. Bartee, who
provided direction and guidance necessary for a successful dissertation. Finishing this
dissertation meant finally fulfilling a lifelong goal and I am very thankful.
I would like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. Walter Doherty, Dr. William
Gordon, and Dr. Dave Edyburn for their insights and advice throughout this study.
I would like to thank my wonderful and supportive parents Doris and Stuart Berk for
always believing in me, offering words of wisdom, and pushing me through what seemed like a
never-ending process.
I would like to thank my loving fiancée Dr. Corey Gammon for helping me through this
dissertation journey. We met at the start of my doctorate program and at the end I became his
fiancée! I now pronounce you Dr. and Dr. has a nice ring to it! Thank you for committing so
much love, support, encouragement, patience, and understanding to me.
I am lucky to have such an amazing support group in my life to help me with all of life’s
obstacles.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
Statement of the Problem ............................................................................................................ 3
Purpose of the Study ................................................................................................................... 5
Conceptual Framework ............................................................................................................... 6
Definition of Terms................................................................................................................... 11
Significance of the Study .......................................................................................................... 13
Limitations of the Research Study ............................................................................................ 14
Organization of the Study ......................................................................................................... 15
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE ......................................................................... 16
Historical Perspectives of Teacher Advocacy in Education ..................................................... 18
The Rise of Teacher Associations......................................................................................... 22
Strike for Union Power ......................................................................................................... 26
Political Involvement in the History of Collective Bargaining ............................................ 28
Summary of Teacher Rights ................................................................................................. 31
The Florida Context .................................................................................................................. 32
Demographic and Policy in Florida ...................................................................................... 32
Rights and Responsibilities of Florida Teachers .................................................................. 37
Collective Bargaining and Unions in Florida ....................................................................... 42
The Role of Unions in Collective Bargaining....................................................................... 46
Conflict Resolution ............................................................................................................... 49
iv

Unfair Labor Practice and the Status of Right to Strike ....................................................... 51
Collective Bargaining and Contractual Agreements................................................................. 51
Walton and McKersie (1991) Four Subprocesses of Negotiation ........................................ 59
Summary of the Literature Review ........................................................................................... 63
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS ........................................................................... 65
Procedures in the Research Study ............................................................................................. 66
Background of the School Districts .......................................................................................... 67
Research Design........................................................................................................................ 69
Data Collection Measures ......................................................................................................... 73
Data Analysis ............................................................................................................................ 74
Summary of the Methods .......................................................................................................... 80
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH FINDINGS ............................................................................. 81
Collective Bargaining Agreements and Florida Public School Districts .................................. 83
Collective Bargaining Agreements and Demographical Indicators .......................................... 93
Summary of Chapter Four ...................................................................................................... 118
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS . 120
Summary of the Study ............................................................................................................ 120
Discussion on Collective Bargaining Agreements and Florida Public School Districts ........ 123
Discussion on Collective Bargaining Agreements and Demographical Indicators ................ 130
Implications for Practice ......................................................................................................... 134
Recommendation for Further Research .................................................................................. 136
v

Conclusions from the Research Study .................................................................................... 137
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 139

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 : Selected Contractual Provisions and Accompanying Questions ..................................... 7
Table 2: Rationale for Selected Provisions ..................................................................................... 9
Table 3: Literature Review Topics ............................................................................................... 16
Table 4: Historical Timeline of Teacher Advocacy in Education ................................................ 18
Table 5: Collective Bargaining Subprocesses and Negotiation Framework ................................ 60
Table 6: Key Aspects of Qualitative Content Analysis ................................................................ 71
Table 7: Matrix of District and Provisions ................................................................................... 77
Table 8: Frequency Table for Provision Number One (Release Time for Negotiations) ............. 84
Table 9: Frequency Table for Provision Number Two (Posting of Certificated Vacancies) ........ 85
Table 10: Frequency Table for Provision Number Three (Length of School Day) ...................... 86
Table 11: Frequency Table for Provision Number Four (Consequences for Performance) ......... 87
Table 12: Frequency Table for Provision Number Five (Appeal of Negative Evaluation) .......... 88
Table 13: Frequency Table for Provision Number Six (Grieve Disciplinary Action) .................. 89
Table 14: Frequency Table for Provision Number Seven (Order of Layoffs) .............................. 90
Table 15: Frequency Table for Provision Number Eight (Other Order of Layoffs) ..................... 91
Table 16: Collective Bargaining Provision of Themes and Sub-Themes ..................................... 92
Table 17: Crosstabulation for Provision One by District Rating (Grade) .................................... 94
Table 18: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision One ............................................................... 95
Table 19: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision One .............................................. 96
Table 20: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Two ............................................................ 97
Table 21: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Two .............................................................. 98
vii

Table 22: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Two.............................................. 99
Table 23: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Three ........................................................ 100
Table 24: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Three .......................................................... 101
Table 25: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation Provision Three ............................................... 102
Table 26: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Four .......................................................... 103
Table 27: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Four ............................................................ 104
Table 28: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Four ........................................... 105
Table 29: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Five .......................................................... 106
Table 30: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Five ............................................................ 107
Table 31: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Five ............................................ 108
Table 32: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Six ............................................................ 109
Table 33: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Six .............................................................. 110
Table 34: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Six.............................................. 111
Table 35: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Seven ........................................................ 112
Table 36: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Seven .......................................................... 113
Table 37: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Seven ......................................... 114
Table 38: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Eight ......................................................... 115
Table 39: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Eight ........................................................... 116
Table 40: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Eight .......................................... 117

viii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
One of the most important if not the most important set of regulations that govern school
district policy is the collective bargaining agreement which can run hundreds of pages (Strunk &
Grissom, 2010). According to The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, collective
bargaining is defined as:
“the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement,
or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contact incorporating
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession” (p. 9).
Congress enacted the Wagner Act, or the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 to protect the
rights of employees and employers to bargain collectively (National Labor Relations Act, 1935).
Collective bargaining in education has since had a profound impact on schools because of
the difference that collective bargaining agreements or CBAs make with educators regarding the
conditions of their employment.
Hornick-Lockard (2015) found that 45 of 50 states were able to use collective bargaining
for negotiating items such as better wages and improved working conditions. Florida is one of
the 45 states which has mandated collective bargaining within the public school system under
Florida Statute § 447 (2018). Collective bargaining allows teachers to speak freely for what is
best for both students and teachers. According to Florida Statute § 447.309 (2018), Labor
Organizations, the certified bargaining unit shall bargain collectively with attempt to represent
1

the views of the public employees within the bargaining unit. An agreement shall not be binding
until approved by the public employees who are members of the bargaining unit. When unions
create better working conditions for their teachers, they are more likely to remain at those
schools, rather than move on to seek a different school with better conditions. This may also
encourage more professionals to enter teaching (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). A study done
for the National Bureau of Economic found that financial incentives helped low-performing
schools attract and keep academically talented teachers (Steele, Murnane, & Willett, 2009). A
competitively allocated $20,000 incentive called the Governor’s Teacher Fellowship or GTF was
offered to attract talented inexperienced teachers in California in 2000 and 2002 (Steelman,
Powell, & Carini, 2000). The California study found that without the GTF incentive, teachers
would have been less likely to teach and/or remain in low-performing schools for at least four
years (Steele, Murnane, & Willett, 2009).
It has been shown that highly effective teachers are the most important within-school
determinant of student success (Gallagher, Goodyear, Brewer, & Rueda, 2012). Because
classroom teachers are essential to student success (Gallagher, Goodyear, Brewer, & Rueda,
2012), it is vital to attract and retain the best possible candidates. “Researchers finally have
demonstrated what parents long have known: teachers differ in effectiveness, and those
differences can have long-lasting effects on students’ learning and life chances” (Hannaway &
Rotherham, 2010, p. 111). One of the key elements in attracting and retaining the most qualified
teachers is the provision of competitive salaries and fringe benefits, items that are always
included in a typical collective bargaining agreement (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Florida
Statute § 447.308 (2018) states the bargaining units shall jointly bargain collectively in the
2

determination of the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of the public
employees within the bargaining unit.
There are different contract terms a teacher may negotiate, such as an annual contracts
and tenure contracts. At the time of the present study, all new teachers were being issued annual
contracts that last for no longer than a school year (Florida Statute § 1012.3). Teachers who
already had tenure contracts written before July 1, 2011 have been grandfathered and can
continue to work under those contracts (Florida Statute § 1012.3). Tenure contracts are
continuing contracts that allow teachers to teach in a district for as long as he or she chooses to
teach unless they are dismissed after due process of legally specified reasons (Johnson et al.,
2008).

Statement of the Problem
School reform is directly or indirectly related to teacher collective bargaining (Hannaway
& Rotherham, 2010). Such relationship makes collective bargaining such an important topic of
concern especially in Florida, with its status as a leader in education reform (Bormna & Dorn,
2007). Teacher collective bargaining studies largely focus on the potential influence of the
provisions in collective bargaining agreements on teacher and student achievement (Goldhaber,
Lavery, & Theobald, 2014). Other discussions of data are dedicated to what influences which
provisions end up in these contracts (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014; Lewin, Keefe, &
Kochan, 2012). To date, there has been limited information on Florida educators’ public school
collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), specifically regarding their similarities and unique
aspects and content.
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Considering what research says about the impact CBAs have on school district
recruitment and performance, research has still overlooked what factors influence the provisions
that ultimately are found in the CBAs. For example, one study found that although collective
bargaining increase school budgets, they ultimately have a negative effect on student
achievement (Hoxby, 1996). “Teachers’ unions are primarily rent seeking, raising school
budgets and school inputs but lowering student achievement by decreasing the productivity of
inputs” (Hoxby, 1996, p. 711). Hoxby (1996) refers to “rent seeking” as teachers’ unions
wanting different inputs than parents do because the unions’ goal is not student achievement.
Another study by Levin and Quin (2003) found that collective bargaining transfer policies allows
suburban districts to hire teachers earlier than urban districts can. “Because of hiring delays,
these districts lose substantial number of teacher candidates…including the most promising and
those who can teach in high-demand shortage areas—to suburban classrooms that typically hire
earlier” (Levine & Quinn, 2003, p. 5). It is not that teachers are not applying, it is that teachers
would become frustrated with the late urban hiring timeline and slow processes and accept a
position in a suburban district (Levine & Quinn, 2003). The impact that collective bargaining has
may not be clear but what is clear is that collective bargaining agreement provisions shape
district policy (Strunk, 2011).
With the influence that collective bargaining agreements can have on a district, unions
need to ensure that the necessary steps are taken toward improving the process of collective
bargaining. Usually teacher contract and the provisions present remain in place for several years.
In Florida, under Florida Statute 447.309, subsection 5, collective bargaining agreements shall
not exceed a term of more than three years. If a contract is lacking provisions, it is brought up at
4

the next set of contract negotiations (Lieberman, 1997). In order to improve collective
bargaining agreement provisions in the future, unions need to be aware of the variations in
collective bargaining from district to district. “Districts and unions alike may learn from and
contribute to their neighbors’ bargaining decisions” (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014, p.
1279). The use of specific terms and conditions in one district’s collective bargaining agreement
may be used in another district however, Goldhaber, Lavery, and Theobald (2014) have found
that geographical location influences the provisions that end up in CBAs.
Exploring collective bargaining agreements may provide a source of valuable information
for both unions and Florida districts.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the mixed-methods study is as follows: 1) to determine the extent to
which CBA provisions exist within the master contracts of Florida teachers (2016-2017) and; 2)
to determine the extent to which, if any, collective bargaining provisions varies according to the
school district (i.e. district size, district performance, district locale). To that end, the research
questions are as follows:
1. To what extent, if any, do collective bargaining agreement provisions differ according
to eight selected provisions among Florida public school district collective bargaining
agreements?
2. How does the presence or absence of the selected collective bargaining agreement
provisions impact demographical indicators of Florida school districts (i.e. district size,
district performance, district locale)?

5

The understanding gained through this investigation provides useful information to policymakers
and practitioners in the state of Florida and offers ways to more effectively generate collective
bargaining agreement provisions.

Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework used to guide this study includes the selected contractual
provisions involving the collective bargaining agreements (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald,
2014). A teacher collective bargaining agreement or CBA is a legal document that covers a wide
array of school district rules which are legal rights and obligations of the school district and the
teachers’ union (Lieberman, 1997; Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014). Items included in a
teacher collective bargaining agreement govern everything including but not limited to: hiring,
compensation, teacher transfers, evaluations, professional development, promotion, grievance,
and termination (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014). “Teachers’ union-district collective
bargaining agreements can be broadly classified into four areas: benefits, working conditions,
evaluations and grievances, and Association rights” (Strunk & Reardon, 2010, p. 639).
“Literature has largely ignored the factors that may determine which provisions appear in
CBAs in the first place” (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014, p. 1275). An assessment of
collective bargaining agreement provisions, when examined in terms of their presence or absence
in Florida school district collective bargaining agreements, should provide valuable insights
especially with the potential relationship that may occur. Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald (2014)
offer eight collective bargaining provisions as a basis for understanding public school collective
bargaining agreements in Florida. To that end, Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald (2014)
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provisions were used as the conceptual framework and can be used for examining the data.
Table 1 presents both the provision categories and the accompanying questions for consideration
as part of the broarder componets of the conceptual framework.
Table 1 : Selected Contractual Provisions and Accompanying Questions
Accessibility

How many provisions does the CBA contain?
How many times was the district contacted to
obtain the CBA? How long is the CBA?

Association

Is there a no strike/lockout clause/
concentrated activities/work stoppage? Does
the district pay for release time for
negotiations for union members?
Is seniority used to decide who is voluntarily
transferred? Is seniority used to decide who is
involuntarily transferred? Does CBA require
that district post all certificated
vacancies/make them available to teachers in
the district? If position is filled with
probationary/temporary teacher, will it be
reopened the following year to members
seeking transfer/reassignment? Does CBA
specify the order in which district can
consider new employees?
Is there a maximum class size for 4th grade?
8th grade? 9–12th grades? Is collaboration
time set aside in CBA for 4th grade? 8th
grade? 9–12th grades? Does the CBA specify
a given length of the school day?
Are there consequences for receiving a
negative/ “unsatisfactory” performance
evaluation? Are teachers with four years or
more experience, who meet or exceed
standards on previous evaluation, evaluated
on a different schedule from less experienced
teachers? Does CBA/evaluation rubric define
the final rating categories? Does the CBA

Hiring and transfers

Workload

Evaluations
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allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a
negative evaluation?
May the teacher grieve disciplinary action?
Does the grievance go to the board? Does the
grievance go to mediation? Does the
grievance go to arbitration?
Is seniority the primary factor that determines
the order of layoffs? Do factors other than
seniority determine the order of layoffs? Does
CBA provide for recall rights after layoffs?
Does CBA specify how re-employment offers
are made after layoffs? Does CBA specify
that re-employment offers are made in reverse
seniority order after layoffs? Can members
reject a re-employment offer after layoff?
Do members receive leave of absence for
family illness/family care? Do members
receive parenting/child-rearing leave? Do
members get additional leave for
pregnancy/maternity? Does CBA specify
what members’ rights of return are from this
leave?

Grievance

Layoffs

Leave

Table 1 provides 40 provisions which have received considerable amount of attention by
teacher or media literature (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014). The responses of these
questions are smiliar to answering a yes/no response survey. More specifically the conceptual
framework is narrow to include eight selected provisions from the identified 40 collective
barganing provisions reported by Goldhaber, Lavery, and Theobald (2014). Those questions are
as follows:
One provision for each of the eight categories was identified based on relevant extant
research (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014). That earlier study drew from the extant
literature to identify 40 salient collective bargaining agreement provisions, grouped into eight
categories. The researcher selected the provisions based upon the importance and concern of the
8

provisions in instructional collective bargaining agreements. These provisions reflect
topics/issues receiving considerable attention in the press and teacher labor literature. Collective
bargaining provisions involving policies has been more recently concerned with the potential
consequences of specific CBA provisions (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014). For example,
the federal government’s Race to the Top grant changed evaluation policies for teachers and
created a lot of attention in education news (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014).
Following below are the identified provisions and the supporting rationale for their
inclusion in this study:
Table 2: Rationale for Selected Provisions
Provision
1. Does the district pay for release time for
negotiations for union members?

Rationale for selected provisions
For provision one, there were two questions
from the category of association. Provision
one (pay for release time) was selected from
the two because the other question asks about
striking and work stoppage. According to the
Florida Constitution, section six states,
Florida is a right to work state meaning that
Florida has the right to bargain collectively
through a labor union. Public employees
shall not have the right to strike (§ 447.505).
A public employee who violates the
prohibition to strike will receive penalties by
Florida Statute § 447.507 which is why this
question was not selected.
Association is the category for provision two.
Senate Bill 736, The Student Success Act, no
longer allowed Florida teachers to receive
tenure contracts if they were hired after July
1, 2011 (§1012.33). For this reason, the
questions relating to senority transfers is more
relevant to continuing contracts hired before
2011, which is why those questions under the
category hiring and transfers were not
selected for this study. First year teachers as
well as annual contracted teachers who were

2. Does CBA require that districts post all
certificated vacancies/make them
available to teachers in the district?
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3. Does the CBA specify a given length of
the school day?

4. Are there consequences for receiving a
negative/unsatisfactory (needs
improvement) performance evaluation?

5. Does the CBA allow for teachers to rebut
or appeal a negative evaluation?

not renewed would be interested in certifacted
vacancies available to teachers in the district.
Provision three is under the category of
“workload”. The question regarding class
size under this category was not selected
because of the addition to the Florida
Constitution in 2011 for public education.
Maximum class size is outlined along with
consequences for not meeting class size
requirements (§ 1003.03). The other question
not selected was about collaboration which is
usually set by the principal of a school or
voluntarily by teachers. The decision to
select the question regarding the length of the
school day was because of the importance of
the expectations set for the workload of a
teacher in a collective barganing agreement.
The collective bargaining’s final agreement
limits the employer from changing the terms
which have been agreed upon in the contract
and lays out the responsibilities of employees
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
Senate Bill 736 brought about a new annual
evaluation system for all teachers using four
distinct levels of effectiveness: highly
effective, effective, needs improvement, and
unsatisfactory (FEA, 2016). This new
evaluation system has been a topic receiving
considerable attention in the press & teacher
labor literature which is why this question
was selected for a provision.
According to Steve Perry (2011), one of
teacher unions’ three main goals is defending
teachers who have been
reprimanded/negatively evaluated. For this
reason, this provision is concerning for union
members as well as teachers. Florida Statute
§1012.34 (Personnel Evaluation and
Procedure) states that an employee rated as
unsatisfactory shall be placed on performance
probation for 90 calendar days. Teachers rated
as needs improvement or unsatisfactory will
receive no salary increase (§1012.22).
Teachers might be interested to appeal a
10

6. May the teacher grieve disciplinary
action?

7. Is seniority the primary factor that
determines the order of layoffs?

8. Do factors other than seniority determine
the order of layoffs?

negative evaluation to avoid such
consequences.
As with provision five (appeal negative
evaluation) unions and teachers would be
interested to learn about provision six because
of the actions that can be taken against a
teacher.
The topic of seniority is discussed in so many
aspects of education. For example, In
the1960s, Albert Shanker and David Selden
(AFT organizer), along with their colleague
George Altomare, forged a compromise
between elementary and secondary teachers to
create a pay differential based on seniority
and level of teacher education rather than on
the grade level taught (Hannaway &
Rotherham, 2010).
Another example is a study carried out by
Moe (2006). Moe (2006) developed an
analytical framework for exploring the
behavioral effects of seniority-based transfer
rights. Anzia and Moe (2014) study is the
latest study done on collective barganing
consequences for seniority-based transfer
rules.
Senority is a topic that is metioned
frequently in the literature review which is
why provision seven and eight were selected.
As with provision seven, provision eight was
selected for the same reasons because both
relate to seniority and layoffs.

These provisions are used to guide the analysis related to selected provisions and demographical
indicators affecting Florida school districts.

Definition of Terms
The following terms are defined in accordance with their importance and their contextual
relevance in this study:
11

Annual contract - An instructional staff employment contract of one school year.
Bargaining Agent- A union made by a government agency or recognized voluntarily by the
employer as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit.
Constitution- Fundamental principles according to Florida state government.
County School Board Rules- Each school board has their own school board policies usually
documented on the school board website.
District Grade- A letter grade of A, B, C, D, or F is assigned to each district annually based in
11 components. District grades are operating as an independent variable for the purpose of
comparing contracts among categories of districts.
Educator- A person who provides education but does not necessarily teach as a job
Enrollment- The 2016-2017 student enrollment was downloaded from the Florida Department of
Education website. Enrollment is operating as an independent variable for the purpose of
comparing contracts among categories of districts.
Florida State Statute- A Florida written law passed by a legislative body.
Independent Variables- For this study locale codes, enrollment, and district grades were used to
create categories for making comparisons.
Locale Code- A general geographic classification of U.S. territories into four types of areas,
city, suburban, town, and rural. Local codes are operating as an independent variable for the
purpose of comparing contracts among categories of districts.
Master contract; collective bargaining agreement - A written document which incorporates all
the items of agreement which were the subjects of the collective bargaining process.
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Politics- The activities associated with the governance of a school, especially the debate or
conflict among the staff.
Teacher- A person who has a job teaching in a school
Teacher unions; teacher associations - Exclusive representative organization chosen by the
teachers of a given school district to negotiate on their behalf.
Tenure; professional service contract (PSC) - An instructional staff employment contract which
is ongoing or self-renewing.
Value-added model (VAM) – A statistical model that estimates a schools’ growth and an
instructional staff member’s growth related to student achievement.

Significance of the Study
This study was intended to provide insight into understanding the prevalence of contract
provisions deemed to be desirable, while also understanding their distribution among varied
districts in Florida. The results obtained from the study may help provide Florida school districts
with information to construct the best possible competitive contracts. This would aid in
attracting top talent while also protecting the best interests of the school districts. Because of the
significant influence and effect that a teacher can have on student achievement, it is desirable for
school districts to attract the highest caliber candidates by offering competitive and attractive
contracts. This involves understanding the law, provision of contracts, and the common terms of
those contracts. Distinctions between the contracts can influence or encourage (in)equity and/or
(in)equality between districts based upon size, performance and locale. The study further offers
an opportunity to understand collective bargaining agreements in a more meaningful way that
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generates insight into the various tenets and expectation of fair practice by the union and the
school board. Given the lack of information and research on the terms and conditions of
appointed Florida instructional staff, it was clear to the researcher that there was a need for
additional information on the subject.

Limitations of the Research Study
Some of the data collected for this study was provided by the respective school districts,
and other data were obtained from teacher union websites. The researcher relied on the accuracy
of the data obtained from these two sources. Sources of data for the study were also limited to
2015-2016 public instructional staff collective bargaining agreements from the state of Florida.
Florida charter schools were not included in this study. Of the 67 collective bargaining
agreements, only one was not able to be obtained by searching, calling or e-mailing the local
school board website and local teacher union website. Another limitation of the study includes a
potential change in the researcher’s selection of the eight provisions, particularly given how the
researcher selected the eight provisions as based on the current trends influencing CBAs. The
results of the data does not account for districts that are practicing provisions that are not
included in the collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the data collected does not account
for the hidden politics involved in collective bargaining or the informal and side bar agreements
that may exist outside the formal agreement. Hearing the voices of the people involved in the
collective bargaining process might have made a difference in the findings.

14

Organization of the Study
The problem, purpose, and significance of the study, as well as definitions, limitations,
and organization have been presented in Chapter One. Chapter Two contains a review of the
literature and research related to the history of collective bargaining, the Florida context, and
Collective Bargaining and Contractual Agreements rights using collective bargaining
agreements. Chapter Three explains the methodology and procedures used to collect and analyze
the collective bargaining agreements. Chapter Four discusses the findings of the study organized
around the research questions which guided the study. Chapter Five concludes the study with a
summary and discussion of the findings and recommendations for further study.
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The review of the literature represents what other authors and researchers have already
said or done to answer the research questions. This review was done specifically to give
background and help answer the research questions proposed and to identify what has already
been found about them.
Chapter Two is organized into three sections: (a) Historical Perspective on Teacher’s
Rights (b) Florida Context and (c) Collective Bargaining and Contractual Agreements. Table 3
illustrates descriptions of the aforementioned sections:

Table 3: Literature Review Topics
Historical Perspective

Florida Context

Scholars Reviewed
Hornick-Lockard, 2015;
Levine, Lowe, Peterson, &
Tenorio, 1995; Guggenheim,
2011; Ravitch, 2006; Vachon &
Ma, 2015; Ravitch 2006;
Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010;
Compa, 2014; Bascia &
Osmond, 2012; Moe, 2011;
American Federation of
Teachers, 2016; Johnson et al.,
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Hornick-Lockard, 2015;
Johnson, Musial, Hall,
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National Education
Association, 2016; American
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teacher contract,
collective bargaining,
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Collective Bargaining and
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2016; §1012.33; §1012.22;
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revenue, Florida
Education Finance
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Education Enhancement
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Formula for Education
Success, No Child Left
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Florida Comprehensive
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Strunk, 2011; Carini, 2008;
Munk, 1998; Strunk &
Grimson, 2010; Goldhaber,
Lavery & Theobald, 2014;
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Scholars Reviewed
Key Words Used
Moe, 2014; Koshi & Horng,
effects/relationship of
2007; Anzia & Moe, 2014;
collective bargaining
Levin & Quinn, 2003; Freeman,
2012; Anzia & Moe, 2014;
Hoxby, 1996; Vachon & Ma,
2015
Table 3 contains a broad range of sources that are included in Chapter Two’s review of relevant
literature. These sources include articles, handbooks, government documents, U.S. Census
reports, Florida Statutes, empirical studies, journals, and major search engines such as EBSCO
and Google Scholar. These sources provided a reasonable comprehensive review of the
literature necessary for Chapter Two.

Historical Perspectives of Teacher Advocacy in Education
This section focuses on the history and influence that teachers and unions have had on
collective bargaining in education over many years. The history of collective bargaining is
fundamental to the union movement (Hornick-Lockard, 2015). Table 4 illustrates a timeline of
Teacher Advocacy in Education.
Table 4: Historical Timeline of Teacher Advocacy in Education
Year
1857

Historical Educational Event
Earliest form of the National Education
Association (NEA)
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Description of Historical Event
The NEA was established as a
professional association of
educators under the control of
superintendents, principals, and
other administrators. The NEA
was not in the business of
representing teacher interests
rather was interested in
transforming the American
school system.

Year
1901

1902

Historical Educational Event
Mary Murphy, was charged with gross
misconduct and fired because she had
married; however, she sued and was
eventually reinstated.
The first real teacher union, the Chicago
Federation of Teachers, joined the American
Federation of Labor (AFL)

1916

American Federation of Teachers (AFT) was
born.

1960

The United Federation of Teachers (UFT)
received a pledge from Mayor Robert Wagner
of New York City in 1960 to hold an election
for teachers to be able to vote for CB.
Wisconsin and New York passed legislation
allowing for collective bargaining for public
employees

1960’s

1962

Executive Order 10988 was issued by
President Kennedy, yielding federal
employees the right to bargain collectively

1969

The NEA formally declared itself as a union
and went head-to-head with the AFT in
disputes.
Margaret Hall led a group of teachers located
in Chicago to organize a non-NEA union.

1987

2011
2011

Florida Teachers start new evaluation system
under Senate Bill 736
Governor Scott Walker Wisconsin approved
Act 10 which disbanded the unions.
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Description of Historical Event

The emergence of the Chicago
Federation of Teachers was the
beginning of many local unions
such as the AFT.
Membership consisted
disproportionately of activists
rather than teachers who were
dedicated to representing
teachers’ special interests

Collective bargaining was
prohibited almost everywhere in
the United States until this
happened.
Teachers were not directly
affected by this. However, this
helped the entire collective
bargaining movement because
many states started joining this
movement by enacting legislation
that allowed public employees,
including teachers, to organize
The NEA reversed its views from
opposing to supporting strikes
and CB
The Chicago school board was
antiunion and had union members
fired, which severely weakened
the effectiveness of the group

Table 4 contains historical events in chronological order that have influenced education
throughout the years. The historical events included in Table 4 are discussed in Chapter Two’s
review of relevant literature in the first section, Historical Perspective on Teacher’s Rights. This
section will begin by establishing the historical significance of teachers and the evolution of the
responsibilities of the position and rights that have been obtained.
Teachers have had a long history of struggle for rights prior to collective bargaining
(Ravitch, 2006). Teachers were collectively powerless until they eventually organized and
formed unions. At first, teachers would form small organizations, which later led to the start of
unions and eventually towards collective bargaining in education, and the powerful leverage that
they provided. Collective bargaining became a powerful tool for teacher unions to create better
working conditions for teachers throughout history and to date. Fair wages and improved
working conditions are two distributive issues that spawned the labor unions and continue to be a
topic of discussion.
In the early decades of public schools in the U.S., teachers had very few standards to
meet and virtually no rights. The general requirements to be hired as a teacher were to pass
locally created trustees’ examinations and to have basic literacy and numeracy skills; moreover,
teachers were subject to supervisory rules that not only defined what and how to teach, but also
extended into their personal lives (e.g., placing restriction on dating, marriage, and dress)
(Levine, Lowe, Peterson, & Tenorio, 1995).
Collective bargaining did not exist during the 19th center, and teachers had little
protection or recourse. Teachers were regularly harassed by administration and often dismissed
at any given time (Vachon & Ma, 2015). In 1901 a teacher, Mary Murphy, was charged with
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gross misconduct and fired because she had married; however, she sued and was eventually
reinstated. (Ravitch, 2006). There was also the issue of women being paid less than their male
counterparts based on the idea that men, unlike women, had a family to support (Guggenheim,
2011; Ravitch, 2006). This created a divide, wherein elementary school teachers, who were
mostly women, supported equal pay, but high school teachers, mostly men, supported a large pay
differential. Teachers fought amongst themselves because of differences of race, ethnicity, and
where they taught (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). The differences between teachers created a
divide that prevented them from working together and instead created disunity and fighting
within the teaching profession making teacher organization powerless to collective bargaining
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Administrators used these divisions to their advantage by
turning teachers against one another so that they would not cooperate in contract negotiations.
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Negotiators such as administrators trying to change the
feelings of the other party to get what they want out of the negotiation is an example of
attitudinal structuring (Walton & McKersie, 1991). Teachers were powerless when they were
not united, creating another obstacle to collective bargaining (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
Something needed to be done to eliminate pay disparities, so in 1906, the Interborough
Association of Women Teachers started a campaign to wipe out the gender salary differentials
(Ravitch, 2006). The Association Bill for Equal Pay was oringally vetoed by Governor Hughes
on 1907 but the fight for equal pay was finally won in 1912 (Ravitch, 2006).
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The Rise of Teacher Associations
Teachers wanted to ensure they had protection and rights; however, during the 19th
century collective bargaining was viewed as a criminal conspiracy; it was not until the 20th
century that collective bargaining would be enabled and protected by legislation (Compa, 2014).
The origin of collective bargaining in education began with the rise of teacher unions, also
known as teacher associations. With the rise of standardized public education and teacher unions
at the turn of the 20th century, came the earliest form of the National Education Association
(NEA) in 1857 (Bascia & Osmond, 2012). Even though most of its members were teachers, the
NEA was not always controlled by teachers as it is today. The NEA was established as a
professional association of educators under the control of superintendents, principals, and other
administrators. The NEA was not in the business of exclusively representing teacher interests
(as the teachers understood them) or righting their grievances. Rather, it was in the business of
carrying out what, by the turn of the century, would be regarded as the progressive
transformation of the American school system. This was anticipated to occur by removing
schools from the clutches of party machines and patronage (and thus from existing forms of
neighborhood and community control, which were highly politicized) and placing them under
the control of professionals in more centralized, more rule-governed organizations run by experts
by the administrators themselves. (Moe, 2011). The act of placing schools under the control of
administration was yet another obstacle to collective bargaining especially because the NEA was
against collective bargaining (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
Margaret Hall led a group of teachers located in Chicago in 1987 to organize a non-NEA
union but the Chicago school board was antiunion and had union members fired. This severely
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weakened the effectiveness of the group (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Local administrators
encouraged and sometime required teachers to join the union, but businesses fought against them
(Moe, 2011). School boards were often controlled by businesses leaders who would at times fire
teachers who joined unions (Moe, 2011). The majority of teachers were women who could not
vote at the time, making them less of a threat to the politicians who opposed them (Moe, 2011).
For this reason, women were less likely than men to join a union (Moe, 2011). Also, teachers
were reluctant to join a union because, at that time, because unions were considered to be geared
more for blue-collar workers without degrees while teaching was considered to be a white-collar
profession (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
At the end of the 19th century, professionally organized teacher associations began to
emerge (Vachon & Ma, 2015), and by 1902 the first real teacher union, the Chicago Federation
of Teachers, joined the American Federation of Labor (AFL). The emergence of the Chicago
Federation of Teachers was the beginning of many local unions such as the American Federation
of Teachers (AFT) which was founded in 1916 (American Federation of Teachers, 2016). The
AFT membership consisted disproportionately of activists rather than teachers who were
dedicated to representing teachers’ special interests and was struggling while the NEA was
quickly becoming the leading organization (Moe, 2011). This trend would soon be reversed, as
the NEA would later struggle when teacher unions grew stronger (Hannaway & Rotherham,
2010). The first person to receive an AFT membership card was the union’s intellectual guru,
John Dewey who encouraged teachers to attend school board meetings to make requests for
salary increases (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
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In the strictest sense, when collective bargaining between unions and school boards did
not exist, union members participated in what they instead called “collective begging”
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Public employees formed associations that would lobby
legislatures for improved working conditions and salaries, two conflict theory items (Compa,
2014; Walton & McKersie, 1991). Teachers in the classrooms had huge responsibilities and they
were told what they were required to do with little protection or recourse. This eventually forced
teachers to organize into formal labor unions to obtain the political power to voice their
concerns. They were eventually forced to take matters into their own hands by meeting
informally with boards of education and with the superintendent to discuss salaries and other
teacher welfare provisions (Johnson et al., 2008). The First Amendment of the Bill of Rights
states that people have the right to peaceably assemble (U.S. Constitution). The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935 ensured that public
employees were able to exercise their First Amendment right (Hornick-Lockard, 2015).
At all levels, the government opposed teacher unions and argued that collective
bargaining was an improper delegation (Moe, 2011). It is interesting that President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who was a supporter of collective bargaining in the private sector, opposed it in the
public sector (Moe, 2011). Roosevelt wrote in a 1937 letter, “actions looking towards the
paralysis of government by those who have sworn to support it are unthinkable and intolerable”
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 9). There was a rationale behind all of this called “sovereign
authority” which posited that the government should have complete control over public sectors
(Moe, 2011). This idea was created under the old patronage system in which government jobs
were controlled by party bosses and public officials (Moe, 2011). While the people in control
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would use these jobs as political currency to maintain their political machines (Moe, 2011),
employees were always at the mercy of the government system, and unions were in direct
conflict with the government system.
As time went on, the public education system in America grew and became more
standardized (Bascia & Osmond, 2012). This helped the teacher labor movement grow, first in
the 1930s in major urban centers, and then in the 1960s in 32 states when teachers started
working to pass collective bargaining legislation (Bascia & Osmond, 2012). During the mid20th century, there were events that occurred that created a push for collective bargaining. As
the private-sector labor movement started winning collective bargaining for wage increases,
teachers’ pay was still poor, especially considering that most teachers held college degrees. The
average factory worker made $400 more per year than the average teacher in America
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). This is a shocking disparity of pay considering the majority of
teachers had college degrees (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
Another push came from teachers’ frustrations over poor working conditions. Teachers
were given non-educational job responsibilities beyond their regular educational job tasks such
as raking snow off school grounds and lunch duty during their own lunch breaks (Hannaway &
Rotherham, 2010). Administrators were able to ask this of teachers, along with other tasks,
rewarding compliant teachers with better class assignments and penalizing resistant teachers with
tougher classes and more challenging students (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Without
collective bargaining agreements providing for grievance proceedings, administrators were free
to continue this treatment of teachers (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
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Collective bargaining was prohibited almost everywhere in the United States until the
1960s, when states such as Wisconsin and New York passed legislation allowing for collective
bargaining for public employees (Vachon & Ma, 2015). To address teacher disunity and pay
discrepancy, the Teachers Guild merged with high school teachers to create the United
Federation of Teachers (UFT) (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Albert Shanker and David
Selden (AFT organizer), along with their colleague George Altomare, forged a compromise
between elementary and secondary teachers to create a pay differential based on seniority and
level of teacher education rather than on the grade level taught (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
The UFT asked for and received a pledge from Mayor Robert Wagner of New York City in 1960
to hold an election for teachers to be able to vote for collective bargaining. However, Mayor
Robert Wagner eventually failed to follow through on this promise (Hannaway & Rotherham,
2010).

Strike for Union Power
The UFT needed to decide what its next move would be. Striking, a powerful union
weapon that was used to fight for union power and win contracts, was made illegal under the
1947 Condon-Waldin Act (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010; Moe, 2011). Shanker believed it was
necessary to strike if the UFT was to be taken seriously, so he staged a one-day walkout with the
UCT and the local members of the AFT in response to Mayor Wagner’s backsliding on his
promise (Moe, Special Interest: Teachers Unions and America's Publib Education, 2011). It was
dangerous to strike with such small numbers; approximately 10% (5,000 of 50,000) of teachers
walked out, however, they did not lose their jobs because it was impractical to fire all the people
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involved (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). The strike was therefore deemed to be a success.
Mayor Wagner allowed an election, and the teachers voted to support collective bargaining with
the United Federation of Teachers acting as their exclusive representative (Moe, 2011).
The NEA was against the use of strikes, criticizing them as unprofessional and a bad
example to students (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). They believed that when teachers went
out on strike, they were breaking the law and setting a bad example to the students, (e.g., seeing
their teachers using illegal tactics to get what they wanted) (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
The UFT and AFT differed considerably in their views. Shanker argued striking is breaking the
law on principal and that a “teachers’ strike involves public inconvenience rather than an
endangerment of public health and safety, as strikes among other public employees, like police
or firefighters, might” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 11). Although the NEA was against
strikes, the strikes effectively worked and helped in the fight for collective bargaining.
The effectiveness of striking resulted in more and more frequent strikes over the years
and by 1975-76, a record number 203 teacher strikes (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Strikes
were effective because they disrupted schools, putting pressure on public officials to come to an
agreement. As time went on and unions became more firmly established, the political climate
towards unions changed, the number of strikes declined as they damaged unions’ image
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 15).1
The threat to union power continued into the twenty first century with Governor Scott
Walker’s 2011 Wisconsin Act 10, also known as Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill (Hauer, 2018).

1

As will be discussed in a later section, Florida is one of only 38 states in which striking is still illegalInvalid
source specified.
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Act 10 was proposed as a budget bill to remedy a projected multibillion-dollar deficit (Hauer,
2018). The bill dramatically curtailed collective bargaining for most public employees,
including teachers, when it was passed in 2011The unions say Act 10 has caused and continues
to cause irreparable injury to the unions (Hauer, 2018). Before Act 10, unions in Wisconsin
could bargain over wages and a wide variety of items relating to conditions of employment (Ford
& Ihrke, 2018).

Political Involvement in the History of Collective Bargaining
In 1962, Executive Order 10988 was issued by President Kennedy, yielding federal
employees the right to bargain collectively (Hornick-Lockard, 2015). Teachers were not directly
affected by this. However, this helped the entire collective bargaining movement because many
states started joining this movement by enacting legislation that allowed public employees,
including teachers, to organize (Hornick-Lockard, 2015). This was a milestone for workers who
were not previously protected by the old laws.
Teachers now being allowed to bargain collectively opened the flood gates, and teachers
organized together to address the unprofessional and unfair ways administration had treated them
(Vachon & Ma, 2015). The unions began pressuring the city for 147 or more items dealing with
teachers’ concerns (Moe, Special Interest: Teachers Unions and America's Publib Education,
2011). Items included substantial pay raises, free lunch periods, check-off for union dues and
other items dealing with workplace conditions (Moe, 2011). Shanker called for another strike
and was successful yet again, winning the nation’s first major collective bargaining contract in
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public education. Items included in the contract were large pay increases, a responsibility-free
lunch, and other workplace concessions (Moe, 2011).
Unions then began to expand the scope of bargaining to also include educational quality.
“In 1963 the UFT pushed for a reduction in class size and the establishment of a special
enrichment program for ghetto schools, which the union helped design, called More Effective
Schools” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 13). Some were opposed to the idea of negotiating
educational quality. Myron Lieberman felt it was ridiculous to explain the scope of bargaining,
saying it is like the United Auto Workers negotiating over the “price of cars, their color, and
safety features” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Shanker responded by saying that “unlike
autoworkers, teachers are blamed when things go wrong” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p.
13). It became difficult to determine what would and would not be negotiable. The UFT went
on strike for 14 days over educational quality issues with the unions’ slogan boasting, “Teachers
Want What Children Need” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 14). To this day, the issue has
never been fully resolved, yet it continues to resurface (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
The collective bargaining contract was a huge win for the union and created a shift in
power. “The NEA was put on notice that, if it didn’t convert itself into a union and compete for
teachers, the AFT was going to win over the entire constitution” (Moe, 2011, p. 47). The NEA
formally declared itself as a union in 1969 and went head-to-head with the American Federation
of Teachers in disputes (Moe, 2011). The NEA reversed its views from opposing to supporting
strikes and collective bargaining (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Because of its nationwide
presence, the NEA was able to maintain its stature as the leading force in American public
education (Moe, 2011).
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A second revolution was called by Shanker in 1980 in which teachers would bargain for
improved education (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Ronald Reagan was a candidate for
election to the U. S. presidency at that time and was very vocal about being anti-union and antipublic education (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Regan’s administration sponsored the report,
A Nation at Risk, which critiqued America’s public schools (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
Shanker decided to use A Nation at Risk as a way to push collective bargaining to new heights.
Shanker felt that the only way to preserve public education in the United States and improve the
status of teachers as professionals was to go beyond collective bargaining (Hannaway &
Rotherham, 2010). As part of his second revolution plan, Shanker came up with ideas for a few
changes in education. He endorsed a controversial program in which teachers peer reviewed one
another (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). This program caught on because some of Florida’s
school districts had implemented peer review into teacher evaluations as part of Senate Bill 736’s
new evaluation system (Senate Bill 736: How will it affect me?, 2016).
Unions have come a long way from the Shanker era and union reforms. By the early 21st
century, public sector union employees outnumbered private ones. 35.9 percent of public
employees belonged to unions in 2012 while only 6.6 percent of private employees. (Johnson,
Musial, Hall, Gollnick, & Dupuis, 2008). The National Educational Association (NEA) is the
largest teacher organization with over 3.2 million members to date (National Education
Association, 2016). The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) is the second largest today
represents 1.6 million members in more than 3,000 local affiliates nationwide (American
Federation of Teachers, 2016). The number of union members in the NEA and AFT alone shows
just how powerful these unions have become.
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There are over 3,000 local affiliates of the AFT and 83 NEA affiliated unions (AFT, 2017
& NEA, 2017), engaged in collective bargaining throughout the 20th century which expanded the
scope of rights, protections, and benefits contained within collective bargaining agreements
(Bascia & Osmond, 2012). “Today there are 32 states that mandate collective bargaining, 5 that
expressly prohibit it, and 13 that allow it (if both teachers and managements agree to it)”
(Vachon & Ma, 2015, p. 394).

Summary of Teacher Rights
The history of teacher unions reveals the progress teachers have made with the assistance
of unions. Teachers were once poorly paid, fired for being married or pregnant, and victimized
in other unprofessional and unfair ways which is what led unions to fight for job security and
higher pay. Teachers needed to ensure that they had protection from unfair and arbitrary
treatment. Collective bargaining and strikes were illegal, however, making it difficult to
leverage school boards. Shanker reminded all concerned when he said, “there would be no
teachers’ unions today if we did not defy the law” (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010, p. 15).
Unions started illegally striking to put pressure on public officials to come to an agreement.
Collective bargaining started taking root in 1960 when states started to pass legislation
permitting bargaining (Vachon & Ma, 2015). As the growth of collective bargaining increased,
so did the growth of teacher unions and union membership. Unions engaging in collective
bargaining expanded the scope of rights of collective bargaining agreements and will continue to
do so today and in the future. “The labor movement built by workers in the United States over
the past century is still a strong base for working class advances and strengthening of collective
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bargaining in years to come” (Compa, 2014, p. 98). Collective bargaining in the 21st century and
in the future, rests upon the foundation built by the struggles and advances of the labor
movement fought by workers over the last 100 years.

The Florida Context
This section focuses on public education in Florida by reviewing Florida’s unique
characteristics and policy context. Given the scale and scope of public schooling in Florida, as
well as its status as a leader with regards to educational reform, the state represents an ideal
context within which to examine the issues of concern to this project (Bormna & Dorn, 2007).
The first part of this section will give a general overview of public education in Florida
discussing the state and its student population, state funding, and education reform. The second
part of this section will be an overview of the policy context in Florida discussing teacher
contracts and collective bargaining.

Demographic and Policy in Florida
Florida became the third most populous state in the nation by adding an average of 803
new resident a day between 2013 and 2014, passing New York (United States Census Bureau
Reports, 2014). Florida’s growth, which enabled it to surpass New York, was fueled by a
growing economy and housing market (Smith & Rayer, 2013). As of 2016, the U.S. Census
estimated the population in Florida to be 20,612,439 people which was 341,167 more people
than the 2015 population estimate. Population growth in Florida is forecasted to continue
strengthening, showing increasing rates of growth averaging 1.4% between 2015 and 2020 (The
Florida Legislator office of economic and Demographic Research).
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The number of students enrolled in Florida public schools has been growing every year
since 2012 with a diverse student enrollment. For the 2016-2017 school year, out of 2,816,824
students that were enrolled in a public school, 61.3% were members of a race other than white,
58% were considered to have an economic disadvantage and 10.4% were considered English
language learner (ELL) status (Student enrolment, 2017). School enrollment of Hispanic
students at all levels grew 35.5% in the 10 years from 2005 to 2015. Immigration has been a
major factor for the rapidly expanding school population and higher percentage of minority
students (Weaver-Dunne, 2000). This is especially true in Miami-Dade County, one of the
largest school districts in the country, where 41% of the county’s schools are overcrowded
(Weaver-Dunne, 2000).
Class size reduction has been a focus in Florida since the passing of Amendment 9 to
Florida’s Constitution in 2002.2 Amendment 9 states that the number of students assigned to
each public school teacher shall be no more than: (a) 18 for pre-K to grade 3 (b) 22 for grades 4
to 8 (c) 25 for grades 9 to 12. Three months after Florida voters approved the class size
reduction, Governor Jeb Bush requested spending of $3 billion a year to meet the new
requirements and to be used for building new schools, allowing more students to transfer
schools, recruiting and adding more teachers, retention, professional development for teachers,
and anything else to help meet the required mandate (Canedy, 2003; Normore & Ilon, 2006).
For the 2014-2015 school year, there were reportedly 180,442.27 full-time public school
teachers in Florida with the US average being 61,419 teachers (US Department of Education).

Per the Florida’s state constitution in Section 1, Article IX, establishes final goals as noted for the beginning of the
2010 school year.
2
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For that same year, 2,756,944 total public students were enrolled making the pupil/teacher ratio
for 2014-2016 school year 15.28 (US Department of Education). Reducing class size is the most
expensive state input that affects student achievement (Normore & Ilon, 2006). Despite this
being the case, the state of Florida ranks near the bottom among states in per-capita education
spending (Canedy, 2003).
Florida has a state funding formula that is lengthy and complex making it difficult for the
public to understand facts about education funding without having accounting knowledge (Aud,
2006). Taxpayers want to know where their tax money is going but have little knowledge of
how education funding is spent, what portions of the money are raised from which sources, and
how the funding is distributed among diverse types of students (Aud, 2006).
“About 10 percent of tax revenue for Florida schools comes from the federal government,
45 percent from the state and 45 percent from local sources. A small amount comes from nontax sources” (Aud, 2006). About two-thirds of all funding were distributed through the Florida
Education Finance Program (FEFP) (Aud, 2006, p. 3). The Florida Legislature established the
Education Enhancement Trust Fund, which includes the net proceeds of the Florida Lottery and
the tax proceeds from slot machines in Broward and Miami-Dade counties (Funding for Florida
School Districs Statistical Report, 2013-14). The FEFP is based on actual student enrolment and
is used as the primary means of funding the operating costs of Florida school districts (Funding
for Florida School Districs Statistical Report, 2013-14).
Spending on education Florida has steadily risen in the past decade since 2006 (Aud,
2006). For the 2016-2017 school year, the Florida Department of Education appropriated
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$7,178 per student, the highest FEFP funding level in Florida history (State board of education
2015-16 legislative budget request, 2014). The legislative budget request for the 2015-16 school
year was $12.82 billion which was a $346.278 million increase from the year before (Funding
for Florida School Districs Statistical Report, 2013-14). Only Medicaid receives a larger portion
of the budget and has a greater cost to the state than K-12 education (Mann & Calabro, 2017). A
couple of the 2015-2016 budget request priorities were a $40 million funding increase for digital
classrooms, and additional funds for repair and maintenance of public school facilities (Funding
for Florida School Districs Statistical Report, 2013-14). After Governor Jeb Bush took office in
Florida in January 1999 expenditures went from $5,701 per student in 1999 to $6,450 in 2002
which is a $300 per student or 5.3 percent growth (Aud, 2006).
Throuout the late 1900s and 2000s, Florida implemented new education reforms
commonly known as the “Florida Formula for Education Success” or simply, the “Florida
Formula”, also known as the “A+ Program” (Carlo, 2015). Govenor Jeb Bush enacted a set of
education reforms emphasizing increased test-based accountablity, competition, increased
standards, and school choice (Carlo, 2015). Govenor Bush’s “Formula” includes: (1) A grading
system from “A” to “F” that holds schools accountable, (2) Allows parents to have school
choice programs and scholarship options for students at “F” school,s (3) Higher standards for
graduation and grade promotions, (4) Allows schools to have more flexibility in their spending
of performance pay, (5) New teacher evaluations and alternative teaching certifications, (6)
Schools must be child centered as opposed to school or district centers (Carlo, 2015; Horne,
2004). Florida became one of the first states to adopt its own school grading system, which is
now ubiquitous throughout the nation (Carlo, 2015). In addtion, the Florida Comprehensive
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Assessment Test (FCAT) was expanded to include Sunshine State standards-based and normreferenced assessments of reading and math in grades 3 through 10; students who scored low on
the FCAT were placed on an improvement plan (Carlo, 2015). The bar was raised in 2003 to
include students with disabilities and English Language Learners (ELL) (Horne, 2004). There
has been a push to advocate for a similar implementation in other states (Carlo, 2015).
Jeb Bush’s brother George Bush became President two years into his brother’s term and
promoted some of the same policies of the A+ program at the federal level with the “No Child
Left Behind Act” (NCLB) of 2001 (Bormna & Dorn, 2007). The NCLB requires states to
evaulate the performances of all public school students in order to determine Adequate Yearly
Progress (AYP) (Horne, 2004). Florida’s approved accountablity plan uses the same FCAT
scores and defintions of “grade level” used in the A+ plan (Horne, 2004). The growth model in
the A+ program allowed Florida to incorporate student growth in determining AYP (Horne,
2004). Florida’s school grading system contained the components of annual learning gains, an
orginial component of the A+ program.
Prior to the NCLB and A+ program, in 1995, the Florida school accountability system
was named “Critically Low Schools” (Horne, 2004). Florida identified 158 schools as criticlaly
low performning schools in reading, math, and writing for two years in a row (Horne, 2004).
These critically low schools received additonal assistance and most schools did not remain on the
list because of their improvement in just one subject area, writing (Horne, 2004). In 1996,
Florida adopted the Sunshine State Standards, Florida’s curriculm framework. In 1998, the first
FCAT was administered to students (Horne, 2004). School results were reported yet not used for
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accountability in 1998 (Horne, 2004). The FCAT helped shape education reform in Florida by
raising standards with increased accountability.
Florida ranked 28th overall with a grade of C compated to the grade of D+ that the nation
as a whole earned on the Quality Counts state of American Education report card (Chalk, 2015).
It was found that minority students in Florida perform better than and have a smaller
acheivement gap from white students as compared to other states. Florida was ranked poorly in
educational spending with a grade of F (Chalk, 2015; Canedy, 2003).

Rights and Responsibilities of Florida Teachers
The rights and responsibilities of Florida teachers are codified in federal and state statutes
and regulations, local laws, and school district contracts (Johnson, Musial, Hall, Gollnick, &
Dupuis, 2008). Of most direct relevance to this study are the rights and responsibilities of
teachers as specified in teacher contracts. The following sub-sections highlight relevant aspects
of teacher contracts in general and of collective bargaining and unions (including discussion of
conflict resolution and unfair labor practices).
Contracts, agreements, and statues give teachers certain rights beyond the constructional
rights and state statute and are considered property interests of teachers (Alexander & Alexander,
2012). The superintendent will recommend terms for contracting employees, and all
instructional staff will receive contracts with a provision for an emergency exception (Florida
Statutue §1012.32). There are different contract terms a teacher may attain, such as an annual
contracts and tenure contracts. At the time of the present study, all new teachers were being
issued annual contracts that last for no longer than a school year (Florida Statute § 1012.3).
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Teachers who have had tenure contracts written before July 1, 2011 have been grandfathered and
can continue to work under those contracts (The 2016 Florida Statute, 2016). Tenure contracts
are continuing contracts that allow teachers to teach in a district for as long as he or she chooses
to teach unless they are dismissed after due process of legally specified reasons (Johnson et al.,
2008).
Senate Bill 736, the Student Success Act, no longer allowed Florida teachers to receive
tenure contracts if they were hired after July 1, 2011. The Student Success Act was the first bill
that Governor Rick Scott signed to fix Florida’s economy as part of his 7-7-7 plan, seven steps to
create 700,000 jobs in 7 years (Staff, 2011). Governor Scott considered that tenure is a costly
decision with lifetime employment estimated to cost $3 million (Curtis & Wurtzel, 2010).
Senate Bill 736 brought about a new annual evaluation system for all teachers using four distinct
levels of effectiveness: highly effective, effective, needs improvement, and unsatisfactory (FEA,
2016). Teachers were evaluated in two parts, classroom evaluation and student learning growth
data. Also, teachers hired on or after July 1, 2014 were paid an evaluation performance rating
salary (§1012.33). With the performance salary schedule or merit pay, teachers were expected to
get pay increases based on performance rating (Staff, 2011). An Annual Contract teacher rated
as effective must receive a salary increase at least 50% but not greater than 75% of that of a
highly effective teacher (§1012.22). Teachers rated as needs improvement or unsatisfactory
would receive no salary increase (§1012.22). The new salary schedule only applied to annual
teachers unless a tenured teacher gave up their tenured contracts to be eligible to receive the new
pay schedule (§1012.33). For this reason, there were two salary schedules, one for tenured
contracted teachers and another for annual contracted teachers (§1012.33).
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Although in theory the idea of teachers being rewarded for their hard work was
appealing, some school districts have not been financially able to keep up with the new
performance salary pay (Mackenzie, 2015). As an example, in Brevard County, a half-cent sales
tax was passed, and teachers hoped that they would be able to use the money to pay for their
performance scale. The proceeds were used instead for critical improvements to school facilities
and educational technology needs as described in a school board resolution adopted in 2012
(Ballot Language, 2012). Teachers were frustrated with their school system for not reopening
compensation negotiations after not receiving a salary increase in light of the passage of the halfcent sale tax (Mackenzie, 2015).
Some would argue that the pay-for-performance model is business-like and that schools
are not businesses. Vollmer (2010) argued against treating schools like businesses and he
believed that teachers were too protected by tenure and that teachers needed accountability to get
them motivated. He changed his mind, however, when he realized that unlike business’ products
in a store, schools cannot send back kids or trade them in, schools must take what the parents
send (Vollmer, 2010). Under the present evaluation plan, a teacher teaching high-needs students
or those with disabilities is evaluated the same as a teacher that happens to have gifted students.
Teachers not only do not have direct control over the type of students they receive, they
also cannot directly control their students’ attendance or attrition patterns. It is not possible to
teach to students who are not present. “High levels of student turnover exacerbate the problem of
quality control. This constant churning undermines the validity of any accountability system,
that tracts the progress of groups as opposed to individuals” (Vollmer, 2010, p. 22). For this
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reason, Volmer (2010) has expressed the opinion that teacher evaluations are unreliable and
should not have any value at all.
Having every teacher, including tenured teachers, evaluated can also be an advantage.
Tenured teachers rated unsatisfactory two consecutive or two of three years will be placed on an
annual contact and then dismissed if not rated higher (Senate Bill 736). In this respect, the new
evaluation system is proactive in striving to remove unsatisfactory teachers from tenured rolls
who should not be teaching students.
An example of unsatisfactory teachers teaching students can be seen in the documentary,
Waiting for Superman (Guggenheim, 2014). Tenured teachers have been shown neglecting
students, not teaching, and reading newspapers during class (Guggenheim D, 2010).
Superintendents have tried firing neglectful teachers but have been unsuccessful (Guggenheim,
2010). Another issue that has given tenure a bad reputation, is dubbed the “lemon dance”, that
schools do with one another (Guggenheim, 2010). Schools essentially swap their poor
performing tenured teachers for other schools’ poor performing tenured teachers in the hope that
they will be an improvement (Guggenheim, 2010). Tenure contracted teachers have security
with their job from capricious action or political motive with the right to protection from
dismissal, and the right to prescribed procedures (Johnson et al.,2008). Annual contracted
teachers do not have this sort of protection.
Annual teacher in Florida can be rated highly effective yet still may not receive a
renewed contract or the right to know reasons for their nonrenewal (Johnson et al., 2008 ; Senate
Bill 736, 2016). The Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth (1972) case involved the issue
of property rights of non-tenure teacher contracts. In this case, a teacher had been hired for a
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school year and was given no particular reason for their non-renewal because the teacher did not
have a property interest.
Understanding state statutes, county school board rules, collective bargaining agreements,
and the Constitution will help teachers to determine and protect their rights and responsibilities
as teachers. Freedom of expression, academic freedom, and freedom of association, and due
process rights are important rights a teacher has and should be aware of. Freedom of expression
is implicit in the First Amendment and is a Constitutional right for public school teachers;
however, this freedom is not absolute. The expression of teachers has been limited, in that
teachers must have some public concern and not just personal with expression (Murray &
Murray, 2014).
Public school elementary school teachers have little say on what will be taught in the
classrooms and therefore little academic freedom. “Academic freedom is the opportunity for a
teacher to teach without coercion, censorship, or other restrictive interference” (Johnson et al.,
2008, p. 207). Given the pressure of high-stakes tests and standards, teachers may feel that they
have little control over what will be taught in the classroom. Everything a teacher plans in the
classroom must align with state standards therefore, teachers do not have “unlimited liberty”
(Alexander & Alexander, 2012). One area where elementary public school teachers actually do
have academic freedom is in their teaching methods. Teachers all have different ways of
delivering lessons to students. It is common to see teachers teach the same subject matter
differently.
Teachers have some freedom with their own personal appearance because it falls under
the umbrella of freedom of expression, however counties usually set guidelines for employees to
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follow. For example, teachers desire to express this freedom of expression via their clothing, but
if the teacher comes to school wearing an inappropriate outfit and it creates a disruption in the
class, the teacher can be told to wear something else. As inferred in the Bill of Rights First and
Fourth Amendments, teachers have the right to privacy with personal matters such as
relationships, family, religion, and other factors of their personal lives outside of work unless it
violates state interests. If teachers’ rights are revoked, they would then have the right to due
process of law under the Fifth Amendment. Federal, state, and county laws must all abide by a
teacher’s rights afforded to them by the Constitution. All laws of the state and rules of the
county should never contradict the United States Constitution.

Collective Bargaining and Unions in Florida
A Collective bargaining agreement is a legal document that governs the relationship
between employers and employees. In the case of teacher collective bargaining, the two
negotiating parties are the school board and the school board union. The school board is legally
responsible for representing the taxpayers’ interest while also balancing the interest of the
parents, students, employees and the districts’ educational program (Lieberman, 1997). The
other negotiation party is the teacher union or labor organization which represents the interest of
the employees and is the exclusive bargaining agent of the teacher bargaining unit (Lieberman,
1997).
A contract negotiated by a teacher union means that bargaining topics such as salaries,
working conditions, and other matters within the scope of the collective bargaining agreement
can no longer be decided unilaterally by the school administrator and board of education.
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Instead, the contract outlines how the teacher union and its members will participate in
formulating the school policies and programs under which they work. (Johnson et al., 2008).
Collective bargaining can be integrative if the union and the school board can a find common
interest in the groups and solve issues by benefiting both parties (Walton & McKersie, 1991).
The final agreement limits the employer from changing the terms which have been agreed upon
in the contract and lays out the responsibilities of employees (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
Hornick-Lockard (2015) found that 45 of 50 states were able to use collective bargaining
for negotiating items such as better wages and working conditions. Florida is one of the 45 states
which has mandated collective bargaining within the public schools under Florida Statute § 447.
The Bureau of Labor and Statistics has 199 teacher collective bargaining contracts on file with
the average length of the contracts in this sample being 105 pages long (Hannaway &
Rotherham, 2010).
Collective bargaining generally falls within two categories, traditional bargaining, also
called zero-sum bargaining, and collaborative-based bargaining (CBB), also called interest-based
bargaining (IBB) (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). In traditional bargaining, there are two
parties with conflicting positions which, in the end, make some type of agreement (Hannaway &
Rotherham, 2010). In interest-based bargaining, communication is key to success, along with
flexibility, problem-solving between the two groups, and discovering common ground
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). In interest-based bargaining the two parties discuss their
concerns with one another to come up with a mutual ground (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
Interest-based bargaining works because teachers and the school board can each benefit from
certain things like high-performing schools. Thus, the two parties can work together to figure
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out their shared concerns (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). It is common for negotiations to
encompass both traditional bargaining and collaborative bargaining (Hannaway & Rotherham,
2010). With the union and the school board having conflicting interests it is not a surprise that
most interactions that occurs at the bargaining table between the union and the school board are
those involving cooperation and conflict (Lieberman, 1997)
Vachon and Ma’s (2015) multilevel random intercept models have been used to examine
the effects of professional union items and industrial union items, both of which have been
commonly involved in labor negotiations. The industrial or economic models of unionism “are
believed to influence the supply of teachers. For example, greater compensation should attract
and retain more highly qualified teachers” (Vachon & Ma, 2015, p. 392). The professional or
noneconomic models of unionism deals with issues of class size and teacher autonomy which
can affect the learning environment created by teachers (Vachon & Ma, 2015). Union topics
negotiated fall either into the professional or industrial models of unionism.
An existing bargaining unit usually begins the bargaining with the board a few months
prior to the expiration date of an existing agreement (Murray & Murray, 2014). The bargaining
parties are usually teams between 3 to 10 persons including a chief negotiator for each party who
usually does the speaking, and sometimes an actual employee as part of the union team (Murray
& Murray, 2014). A state affiliate local employee organization aid is sometimes selected over an
actual employee to help because of their experience, expertise and willingness to serve on the
bargaining team (Murray & Murray, 2014).
At the first negotiation meeting, the two parties will usually discuss rules of procedure
and attempt to explain their proposals (Murray & Murray, 2014). The rules of procedure include
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all the ground rules such as how many people allowed on each negotiating team, a schedule of
when and where to meet, and how press releases will be handled (Murray & Murray, 2014). The
union usually presents their wage, benefits, and conditions of employment in their initial
proposal (Murray & Murray, 2014). The school board will usually try to avoid including
benefits and wages in their proposal, and instead will usually focus on language items that are
included in public employer’s rights (Murray & Murray, 2014).
After the first meeting, the parties will prepare for the negotiation for their next meeting
by reviewing the proposals that were presented to them (Murray & Murray, 2014). Items that are
approved by each side will be marked TA (for a tentative agreement) so that these items can be
re-negotiated at a later time with items such as wages and benefits, which are usually the last
details to be finalized (Murray & Murray, 2014).
While the union team is in the process of negotiating, they report the progress that is
being made to their members and to the executive committee of the union (Lieberman, 1997).
The report includes what the board is opposing and agreeing to so that union members are
prepared for defeat or compromise in areas (Lieberman, 1997). The union reporter should utilize
the board’s argument during negations to explain the unattainable items to union members
(Lieberman, 1997). Reporting to union members not only shows members their efforts, it also
sets realistic expectations. “A skillful union team, just like its board counterpart, is aware that
negations are marked by slow, incremental movement, shaped by compromise, timing, and
political reality” (Lieberman, 1997, p. 13).
As the bargaining process progresses and an agreement is finally reached between the
two parties over the entire collective bargaining contract, the tentative agreement is then
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presented in written form, signed by both the CEO and the bargaining agent, for ratification by
both the public employer and the public employees (Florida Statute §447.309). Florida Statute
§447.309 states that the employers and employees must approve the tentative agreement with a
majority vote. The statue states that if it is not approved by both parties, they are to return to the
negotiating table. Once accepted by both parties, the tentative agreement then becomes a
working master contract.

The Role of Unions in Collective Bargaining
The union is the driving force in collective bargaining and its performance in this mode is
the crucial test for its value to the members of the union (Lieberman, 1997). The main purpose
of teacher unions is to protect the interests and rights of their members, the teachers, from
arbitrary exercise of power by heavy-handed administration (Ravitch, 2006). According to Steve
Perry (2011), teacher unions’ three main goals are, “(1) negotiating working conditions through
contracts with the municipalities, (2) defending teachers who have been reprimanded/negatively
evaluated, and (3) supporting political candidates and legislation that will make it easier for them
to do (1) and (2)” (p.145). Unions give teachers that voice and a way to get teachers involved in
politics. Teacher unions are intended to improve working conditions for teachers in the advance
of public education.
There are national, statewide, and local union organizations. The National Education
Association (NEA) and American Federation of Teachers (AFT) are the nation’s two largest
teacher unions with a combined membership of 4.6 million (Hornick-Lockard, 2015). Local
teacher unions are almost always affiliated with the national union’s NEA and AFT as well as
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with a statewide union (Lieberman, 2000). In Florida, the statewide union is the Florida
Education Association (FEA) which is affiliated with both the NEA and the AFT (FEA, 2016).
The FEA works with local unions “to provide a comprehensive range of member benefits and
services, including legislative advocacy, legal services and professional development” (About
FEA, 2016). Local unions often utilize state associations professional negotiators (Lieberman,
2000).
Even though bargaining varies widely from school district to school district, local unions,
school boards, and teachers will often compare their contracts to other local union contracts
(Lieberman, 1997). If the majority of other associations in the area has successfully negotiated
for dental plans, for example, then achieving dental will be of upmost importance to the other
associations that do not have it (Lieberman, 2000). The union that is the forerunner of benefits
will try to maintain its status as the pioneer of local unions (Lieberman, 2000). When unions set
contract goals, they usually take into consideration what other local unions have achieved
(Lieberman, 2000). The school board takes the union’s proposal and then compares it to other
school districts’ benefits. If the school board decides to offer smaller benefits, there is a good
chance that the union will focus on negotiating those issues (Lieberman, 2000).
The accomplishments of other unions are important only if the membership accepts them
as some of their own goals because the union goals are an expression of its members
(Lieberman, 2000). “The union’s bargaining team often initiates the process of achieving unity
before it enters into negotiation” (Lieberman, 2000, p. 13). Unions face challenges by rival
unions and pressure to achieve teacher benefits (Lieberman, 2000). Unions will often poll the
membership to determine what are the most popular changes wanted and then negotiate for it
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(Lieberman, 2000). The board will also figure out who will be affected by the proposal and what
influence they have within the bargaining unit (Lieberman, 2000). The union is looking for
approval from their members by studying and understanding the membership diversity
(Lieberman, 2000).
Each employee has different needs based on their job description and on their personal
lives. For example, teachers, librarians, nurses, and high school teachers will all have different
working conditions as well as unique problems that are not shared by all the other members in
the union (Lieberman, 2000). For example, senior teachers may want better retirement benefits
while younger teachers may want higher salaries. What needs to happen to resolve these
differences is for the union leadership and its bargaining team to create unity amid the diversity
(Lieberman, 2000). The more their diverse needs are met in the tentative settlement, the more
likely the union members will approve it (Lieberman, 2000). This is important because under
Florida Statute § 447.309, employees voting in the unit must approve the tentative settlement by
a majority vote.
While the unions’ main purpose is to improve the terms and conditions of teacher
employment, the unions’ “true objective” is the unions’ continued existence as an effective
organization (Lieberman, 2000). Of course, while this objective is usually consistent with
teacher best interests, when there is conflict between the teacher welfare and the union welfare,
the union welfare will trump the teacher welfare most of the time (Lieberman, 2000). For
example, if there is only room in the budget for either salary increases for teachers or an agency
fee clause for the union, the union will choose the agency fee clause (Lieberman, 2000).
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An understanding of the mind frame that the school board and the union have when
coming to the negotiation table helps in understanding how negotiations are handled. It is
especially important for the school board to have this understanding for the school board to be
able to set realistic bargaining expectations, plan effective bargaining strategies, and to develop a
school board and union relationship that will aid in the bargaining process (Lieberman, 2000).

Conflict Resolution
If an agreement cannot be made, the two sides would then enter into the conflict
resolution process which is a rare because most conflicts are actually settled before this process
starts (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). However, it does happen when one or both sides declare
themselves at impasse (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Districts, at this point, usually extend
the terms of the existing contract because, under the Florida Constitution, Article 1, section 6,
Right to Work, teachers are prohibited from striking as long as the contract is in effect.
Florida Statute § 447.403 provides various methods for conflict resolution including
mediation, fact-finding, and binding arbitration. Mediation is the mostly widely used impasse
resolution procedure. This is when both parties present their positions to a neutral third party, a
mediator, for assistance in resolution of an impasse. Florida Statute § 447.403 states that one or
both parties appoint a mediator to assist in the resolution of an impasse.
According to Florida Statute § 447.403 if mediation is unsuccessful, the two parties
would then present, at length, the facts of their dispute to a special magistrate to determine a
formal non-binding recommendation. Fact-finding is something that neither party wants to end
up with because the process is grueling and costly for both sides as well as tedious because of the
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large amount of preparation that is needed (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). The magistrate’s
determination is typically only advisory, however, and if the two parties still do not agree, the
disputed impasse is finally resolved by the legislative body (§447.403).
Binding arbitration is used in a few states as the method of last resort for contract
negotiations, and then only rarely (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Florida uses a similar
method except is considered as non-binding arbitration under Florida Statute § 44.103. Florida
Statute § 44.103 states that the hearing will be conducted informally with presentation of
testimony and evidence kept to a minimum. Putting the agreement in someone else’s hand is
something that both parties try to avoid, however, but can be used as a tool if there are no other
better options available. The threat of having to go through fact-finding and then binding and/or
non-binding arbitration can force the two parties to come to some sort of agreement so that they
can avoid going through the harrowing process of arbitration (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
Once the two parties have come to terms and have created a contract, the contract is then
sent to the school board and to the teachers for ratification (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). If
the bargaining team is unsuccessful in persuading the membership that the tentative agreement
represents the best achievable agreement, the settlement will not be ratified (Lieberman, 2000).
However, if the union is successful in persuading the membership, once ratified, and an
agreement has been made, the two parties set a time frame that the agreement will remain
effective, usually three to four years (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Longer contracts often
specify salaries for only a year or two, and then provide for the parties to reopen the salary
negotiation after that time (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).
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If for some reason, a contract needs to be reopened prior to its expiration, it is usually
only for minor changes in which impact bargaining occurs (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010;
Lieberman, 2010). Unlike a full contract, impact bargaining is not formally ratified, however it
still needs to be approved by the school board and the governing body stipulated in the union’s
constitution just like a full contract (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010).

Unfair Labor Practice and the Status of Right to Strike
Florida school board negotiators must avoid all unfair labor practices that are listed under
Florida Statute § 447.501. A failure to bargain in good faith is illegal but it is important to note
that “hard bargaining” is completely legal (Lieberman, 2000). In hard bargaining, each party
tries to get as much as they can from the weakness of the other party while still wanting to reach
terms that are not outrageous (Lieberman, 2000).
Public school teachers in Florida do not have the right to strike. Some believe that
teachers who strike are exhibiting extreme unprofessional behavior and create a disruption to
education by not allowing a school to run efficiently (Johnson et al., 2008). Others have
supported striking as a last resort after other routes have been tried and fail. Regardless of one’s
viewpoint, striking in Florida is still illegal and teachers will incur severe consequences such as
termination or probation if they decided to participate in a strike (§ 447.507).

Collective Bargaining and Contractual Agreements
Contractual agreements were once offered to teachers on a “take it or leave it” basis
(Lieberman, 1997). Teacher unionization has helped change that and one of the ways was
through collective bargaining (Lieberman, 1997). Collective bargaining is a process to create a
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contractual agreement that outlines the rights and obligations of teachers and the school board
(Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Contractual agreements range from a simple short document
to long detailed agreements with all different duration dates (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010;
Lieberman, 1997). When a change to the education workplace is wanted, collective bargaining
is an indispensable tool for the union to use to benefit every Florida educator.
Collective bargaining is a newer topic of research of which we know little about (Anzia
& Moe, 2014; Lewin, Keefe, & Kochan, 2012). There is a small amount of quantitative
literature involving collective bargaining agreements which tend to focus more on the
relationship between collective bargaining and social outcomes (Carni, 2008; Freeman, 2012;
Anzia & Moe, 2014; Nelson & Rosen, 1996; Vachon & Ma, 2015). The influence that is usually
questioned in most of these studies is to determine if there is a correlation between collective
bargaining and student achievement (Anzia & Moe, 2014). Recent research on collective
bargaining agreements now focuses more on the potential influence of the provisions in
collective bargaining agreements (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014). Anzia and Moe
(2014) cite 14 studies dedicated to quantitative studies and state that the literature is scarce,
uneven in quality, diverse in methods and mixed in findings. Vachon and MA (2015), Carini
(2008), Munk’s (1998), Goldhaber and Theobald’s (2014), Koshi and Horng (2007), Freeman
(2010), Hoxby (1996) have found conflicting evidence on whether unions impact school
districts and students.
Carni (2008), Nelson and Rosen (1996), Steelman, Powell, and Carini (2000) studies
focus on the relationship between teacher unions and student achievement, Vachon and Ma
(2015) research the channels or mechanisms through which unions might actually impact
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achievement. Their study examines the effects of two commonly negotiated categories in
collective bargaining agreements, industrial and professional union items, on student math scores
by using a multilevel random intercept model. The authors claim that this study is the first to test
student achievement empirically at a national level. The sample includes 6,791 students from
799 public schools. Vachon and Ma (2015) found that teacher unions are most beneficial to
middle and high achieving students. Through collective bargaining, teachers have higher
salaries, credentialing, and greater autonomy which lead to improve student (Vachon & Ma,
2015).
Another study that utilizes the hierarchical linear modeling to examine the unionachievement effect was done by Vachon and Ma (2015). Carini (2008) and Vachon and MA
(2015) state that this is the only other study they have found that with that objective. This study
uses the same data source as Vachon and Ma (2015) study by using a national data source called
the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS) from 1990 and 1988 when students were in
the tenth and eighth grades (Carni, 2008). Vachon and Ma’s study only looks at math scores, the
data base, reading, history, and science. The study found that bargaining was not associated with
lower student achievement (Carni, 2008).
Munk’s 1998 study at the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, a non-profit think tank,
claims to be the first ever in to systematically analyze the hundreds of collective bargaining
agreements for every school district in a state (Munk, 1998). This study examines the impact
that collective bargaining has on Michigan’s K-12 public education. To improve education for
students, the study gives recommendations for the union to add into their collective bargaining
contracts (Munk, 1998). The study identifies eight key provisions that commonly hinder the
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educational process and can be improved and then reviews seven court rulings on collective
bargaining agreement. The purpose of this study, just like most studies on collective bargaining
agreements, is to promote students and teachers by making recommendations to improve
contract language. Teacher salary, seniority, fringe benefits, are reviewed in contracts and then
the study was ultimately reviewed by professionals working in education to ensure accuracy.
Goldhaber and Theobald’s (2014) more recent study has also examined every collective
bargaining agreement in Washington State. Using every collective bargaining agreement in
Washington, Goldhaber and Theobald (2014) explore the relationship between the restrictiveness
of a bargaining contract in one district and the restrictiveness of contracts in nearby districts.
Unlike most studies on collective bargaining that question the potential influence of the
provisions in collective bargaining contracts on achievement, this study asks what factors
influence the provisions that end up in these agreements. Goldhaber and Theobald (2014) coded
each collective bargaining contract from the 2010-2011 school year using a rubric developed by
Strunk and Reardon (2010). Goldhaber and Theobald (2014) followed the authors by using a
partial independence item response (PIIR) model that treats each provision in a contract as if it
were a response to a survey. The absence of a given provision within a contract indicated a
negative response to the question (Strunk & Reardon, 2010). The authors found that spatial
relationship plays a major role in determining bargaining outcomes.
Strunk and Reardon (2010) explore the restrictiveness of California contracts in their
study to determine union strength. Determining the restrictiveness of contracts is rather common
for collective bargaining studies. It is less common to find literature that questions union
members’ strengths in impacting important decisions which affect collective bargaining
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agreements. This is mainly due to the difficulty researchers face in measuring union strength.
Strunk and Reardon (2010) use collective bargaining agreements negotiated between unions and
school board to determine union strength compared to the employer. 39 out of 334 contract
items were used as a response to a survey to measure contract restrictiveness. Contracts that
contain outcomes that are more union-friendly indicated that those unions are stronger than
management (Strunk & Reardon, 2010). The goal of this study is to create a measure of contract
restrictiveness for future researchers to examine documents with (Strunk & Reardon, 2010).
What is different about Strunk and Reardon’s (2010) research is that instead of using survey
data, collective bargaining agreements are used to measure union strength rather than ability or
trait.
Strunk and Reardon (2010) conclude that one district’s collective bargaining agreement
influences the terms and conditions in other districts bargaining especially when the districts
have proximity to each other. A finding is that low poverty school districts are not significantly
correlated with contract restrictiveness (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014). Another study
done by Strunk and Grimsom (2010) finds that stronger unions lead to less flexibility than do
contracts in districts with weaker, less active unions.
A study carried out by Moe (2006), developes an analytical framework for exploring the
behavioral effects of seniority-based transfer rights. Just like the Goldhaber and Theobald
(2014) study and most studies on contracts, coding is used on the collective bargning agreements
for a large sample of California elementary school districs and then emerical tests are conducted.
This is considered to be a fixed-effects econometric approach (Moe, Bottom-Up structure:
Collective bargaining, transfer rights, and the plight of disadvantaged schools, 2006). It is found
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that seniority-based transfer rights do indeed affect the way teachers get distributed across
schools with disadvantaged schools receiving the most inexperienced teachers (Moe, Bottom-Up
structure: Collective bargaining, transfer rights, and the plight of disadvantaged schools, 2006).
Koshi and Horng (2007) use Moe’s study as a starting point and model their study by
using the same basic framework to analyze data from a newer and larger sample. The sample
also includes Los Angeles’ middle schools making this study roughly three times larger than that
of Moe’s study (Anzia & Moe, 2014). There are some differences in the study such as a
different coding scheme and a hierarchical linear model approach by Raundenbush & Byrk. As
noted earlier, Vachom and Ma (2015) also use a hierarchical linear modeling approach. Another
difference is that Koshi and Horng (2007) have an entirely different outcome than Moe (2007).
What is found is that seniority-based transfer rights do not influence the distribution of
inexperienced teachers across schools with disadvantaged students (Koski & Horng, 2007). The
explanation for two contrasting outcomes could be because of the different approaches that are
taken: Koshi and Hong (2007) use a linear model approach but the Moe (2014) study uses a
fixed-effets econometric approach.
Anzia and Moe (2014) study is the latest study done on collective barganing
consequences for seniority-based transfer rules. As Anzia and Moe (2014) state, “researchers
have almost never carried out quantitative studies of the contents of labor contracts, their
implications for organization, and their broader behavioral consequences” (p.100). Their
research wants to move in this direction. This study takes an even more different approach to the
topic than the previous two authors have taken. The focus is entirely on teacher experience
rather than analyzing experience and credentials separately (Anzia & Moe, 2014). Koshi and
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Horng’s hierachical linerar model is used with original data sets and all of their original variables
(Anzia & Moe, 2014). The sample is slightly different as it is restricted to elementary schools
and excludes Los Angeles (Anzia & Moe, 2014). The aim of the study is to clarify the models
and methods used in other studies and demonstrate that they all actually lead to the same basic
conclusion about senority-based transfer rights, which is that senority-based transfer rights lead
to more inexperienced teachers at disadvantaged schoools (Anzia & Moe, 2014). A similar study
by Levin and Quinn (2003) finds that transfer policies in collective bargaining agreements causes
urban districts to hire teachers much later than districts in the suburbs. These conclusions could
possibly be an explanation for the unequal and unfair distribution of experienced teachers.
Freeman (2010), studies the impact of two distinct types of bargaining styles on faculty
salaries, benefits and work relationships. This study was conducted in Illinois using interviews
and contract comparisons of salaries. The qualitative part of this study is the 13 interviews
which participate in both types of bargaining styles. The interviews were conducted person-toperson with open-ended questions about perceptions or experiences. The quantitative part of the
study is the comparison of six contracts from three districts spanning a twelve-year period
bargained under each style. It is found through the interviews that most the participants prefer
interest-based bargaining because of the communication at the bargaining table (Freeman, 2012).
It is also found that participants had more negative commentary about traditional bargaining
(Freeman, 2012). Additionally, there is a very slight increase in the cost of the language tied to
the interest-based process (Freeman, 2012).
The exsisting studies investigating collective barganing agreements show commonalities
and differences among the studies such as, the analyetical framework, coding, content analysis,
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varaibles, sample sizes, and type of study. The studies tend to build upon one another with a
basic analytical framework that is similar in some studies. Moe’s (2006) analytic framework is
rooted in agency theory, transaction cost economics, and related theories of collective action and
cooperation. It seems to be common for the authors to code their contracts in some way and do a
content analysis of agreements. There is a difference with the measure of the key independent
varaibles, the range of coding their labor contracts, and the different samples sizes (Anzia &
Moe, 2014). The studies range from qualitative, quantatiative, and mixed methods. Some
studies use surveys and content analysis of collective barganing agreements while other studies
soley use collective barganing agreements for analysis. For example, Nelson and Rosen (1996)
used statewide averages for the National Assessment of Education Progress to compare student
performance between states that have high, medium, and low levels of union impact (as
determined by the researchers). Freeman (2010) solely uses collective bargaining agreements to
study the impact of bargaining styles on faculty salaries, benefits and work relationships. Some
studies focus on elementary school while others add middle school as well. The findings from
collective bargaining agreement studies are rather mixed as to the degree to which collective
bargaining agreements inhibit school operations and reforms. For example, studies including
Vachon and Ma (2015), Carni (2008), Nelson and Rosen (1996), Steelman, Powell, and Carini
(2000), identify a positive relationship between teacher unions and student achievement. Hoxby
(1996) on the other hand finds that collective bargaining has a negative effect on student
performance.
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Walton and McKersie (1991) Four Subprocesses of Negotiation
Collective bargaining in education is a social interaction between groups of people such
as the unions who represent their employees and the school board. Walton and McKersie (1991)
used the following terminology to define collective bargaining: “labor negotiations as an
example of social negotiations, by which we mean the deliberate interaction of two or more
complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine the terms of their
interdependence” (Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 3). Instructional staff do their work guided by a
set of predetermined rules, to which they agree, that are written in their contracts for
employment. Collective bargaining happens when “one or both parties place high priority on
changing the basic social contract between labor and management” (Walton & McKersie, 1991,
p. xxi). Teacher unions focus on the needs of instructional staff during collective bargaining and
collaborate with school districts to come to an agreement in the contract. “Labor negotiations
usually contain a mixture of conflictual and collaborative items” (Walton & McKersie, 1991, p.
3). Complication can arise as the union and the school board both negotiate for their own selfinterest because in the end they have to come to a mutual agreement.
Walton and McKersie (1991) created “four systems of activity, each with its own
function for the interacting parties, its own internal logic, and its own identifiable set of
instrumental acts or tactics” (p. 4). As illustrated in Table 5, Collective Bargaining Subprocesses
and Negotiation Framework, are descriptive perspectives for different lenses of negotiation.
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Table 5: Collective Bargaining Subprocesses and Negotiation Framework
Lenses of Negotiation
Distributive Bargaining

Integrative Bargaining

Attitudinal Bargaining

Intraorganizational Bargaining

Definition
Competitive negotiation for limited resources.
Each group has its own interest and goals in
obtaining limited resources
When both parties benefit from a solution to a
problem. Both parties gain available
resources.
Negotiators try to change the feelings and
attitudes of the other party in order to attain a
desired goal in negotiation.
The negotiator achieving consensus with their
group

Collective bargaining is rooted in social sciences because of its elements of conflict,
behavioral, game, and social theory (Walton & McKersie, 1991). It can be seen through four
different systems or sub-processes that collective bargaining is a complex negotiation process
that can involve frustration, mediation, disputes, and aggression. Disputes in negotiation can
lead to the feeling of frustration which can lead to aggression, in which case mediation may then
be needed in order to help the parties in a disagreement.
The first sub-process, distributive bargaining, is most familiar to people who have ever
had the occasion to negotiate for anything (Walton & McKersie, 1991). Distributive bargaining
calls for competitive negotiation between groups in hopes of obtaining limited resources by use
of persuasion (Walton & McKersie, 1991). Game theorists would refer to distributive bargaining
as fixed-sum games, observing that one person’s gain is another person’s loss (Walton &
McKersie, 1991). This sub-process is similar to conflict theory in that each group has its own
interests and goals in obtaining the limited resources in direct conflict with the other group. The
conflict can involve allocation of any resources from economic to noneconomic values.
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Integrative bargaining is the second sub-process of negotiation for collective bargaining.
It solves both parties’ problems by finding a common interest between the groups (Walton &
McKersie, 1991). Integrative bargaining occurs when both parties benefit from a solution to a
problem, and both parties gain available resources. “Integrative bargaining refers to the system
of activities which is instrumental to the attainment of objectives which are not in fundamental
conflict with those of the other party and which therefore can be integrated to some degree”
(Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 5). Having a solution to a problem that benefits both negotiating
parties or at least when the gains of one party do not represent equal sacrifices by the other is
when integrative bargaining exists (Walton & McKersie, 1991).
The third sub-process, attitudinal structuring, “influences the relationships between
parties; in particular, such attitudes as friendliness-hostility, trust, respect, and the motivational
orientation of competitiveness-cooperativeness” (Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 5). All these
attitudes and feelings and even the tone that is used by individuals can affect the relationship of
the parties involved which can then influence the labor negotiation (Walton & McKersie, 1991).
A Negotiator tries to change the feelings and attitudes of the other party in order to attain a
desired goal in negotiation. During the negotiation process, relationship bonds can be altered
between the two groups. The purpose of attitudinal structuring in negotiations is to manipulate
and change the feelings and attitudes of the parties toward each other, and this can change the
relationship (Walton & McKersie, 1991). These relationships and the attitudes that define them
have implications for both parties in the negotiation process (Walton & McKersie, 1991). The
first two processes, distributive and integrative bargaining are joint decision-making processes,
but attitudinal structuring is intended to manipulate attitudes and relationships, making it a
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socioemotional interpersonal process (Walton & McKersie, 1991). The issues involved in
collective bargaining can be sensitive subjects that heighten the attitudinal structure. The
direction of change of behavior can subsequently influence changes in decisions.
The final sub-process, intraorganizational bargaining is an integral aspect of the
interparty negotiations and is the function of achieving consensus within each of the interacting
groups (Walton & McKersie, 1991). During intraorganizational bargaining, the chief negotiator
receives two sets of demands, one from his own organization and one from the company. The
job of the negotiator is to come to a consensus. Even though not all parties affected by
negotiations will be at the bargaining table, they are still concerned as to what will transpire
(Walton & McKersie, 1991). “The union negotiator is probably subject to more organizational
constraints than his company counterpart” (Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 6). Stakeholders of
education are very interested in the outcomes of collective bargaining and potentially can
influence what occurs at the bargaining table.
Collective bargaining typically begins with a desire to change a predetermined set of
rules. “We also accept as not requiring explaining the existing set of rules which governs their
continuous interface but then ask what the process is by which these rules are changed
periodically” (Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 2). The negotiators in bargaining live by a set of
unspoken rules that they use for negotiating yet they never question why this is commonly
accepted. For example, “The need to defend one’s self interest and at the same time engage in
joint problem solving vastly complicates the selection of bargaining strategies and tactics”
(Walton & McKersie, 1991, p. 3). It can be difficult to collaborate when the conflict is
negotiation for your own group’s agenda (Walton & McKersie, 1991). Thus, defining the four
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sub-processes of negotiation helps with understanding the complexity of collective bargaining.
These sub-processes are interrelated and can affect one another.
Walton and McKersie’s (1991) four sub-processes of collective bargaining can be used as
a basis for understanding public school collective bargaining agreements in Florida. The
framework shows how a complex interaction occurs between the union and school board during
the collective bargaining process. Walton and McKersie’s (1991) framework helps in
understanding this interaction and how it can influence the outcome of collective bargaining. To
that end, the four sub-processes serve as lenses that can be used in examining collective
bargaining agreements studies and understanding how to more effectively determine the
integrate processes related to collective bargaining agreement processions in Florida schools and
their implications for negotiation.
Together, the studies on collective bargaining agreements provide a useful foundation for
exploring what factors influence these contracts as well as what the effects of the provisions in
the contracts have on schools. Continuous research on this new literature will help bring clarity
and consistency to collective bargaining studies. Further research on teacher collective
bargaining can only provide more information for unions interested in improving schools
(Vachon & Ma, 2015).

Summary of the Literature Review
In conclusion, this investigates the historical perspectives of teacher advocacy in
education, the Florida context, and collective bargaining and contractual agreements that are
articulated as background for this study. The review of literature begins with a section on the
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historical perspective on teacher rights, teacher unionism and collective bargaining in education.
The history of teacher unions reveals the progress that teachers have made through the assistance
of unions. Collective bargaining in the 21st century and in the future rests upon the foundation
built by the struggles and advances of the labor movement fought by workers over the last 100
years. The history of teacher unionism has led to today’s unresolved issues in Florida, a leader
of education reform (Bormna & Dorn, 2007). The second section, the Florida context focuses on
the public education in Florida by reviewing Florida’s unique characteristics and policy context.
The last section is a review of literature relating to the extant research investigating teacher rights
using contracts. Together, the studies on collective bargaining agreements provide a useful
foundation for exploring what factors influence these contracts as well as what the effects of the
provisions in the contracts have on schools. Continuous research on this new literature will help
bring clarity and consistency to collective bargaining studies. Further research on teacher
collective bargaining can only provide more information for unions interested in improving
schools (Vachon & Ma, 2015).
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS
The primary goal of this mixed-methods study was to investigate the prevalence among
Florida school district collective bargaining agreements of provisions identified in extant
research as desirable for teachers, and to describe their distribution among different categories of
school districts in Florida. The decision to focus on Florida collective bargaining agreements
was based on the state’s unique characteristics and the diverse nature of its counties. Florida’s
67 counties vary greatly in their size and socioeconomic status. School reform is directly or
indirectly related to teacher collective bargaining (Hannaway & Rotherham, 2010). Such
relationship makes collective bargaining such an important topic of concern. This study sought to
answer the following research questions:
1. To what extent, if any, do collective bargaining agreement provisions differ according
to eight selected provisions among Florida public school district collective bargaining
agreements?
2. How does the presence or absence of the selected collective bargaining agreement
provisions impact demographical indicators of Florida school districts (i.e. district size,
district performance, district locale)?
These research questions provided direction for the study to guide the researcher’s dissertation.
The questions arise after realizing they remained unanswered in the current literature. The first
question determines the presence of collective bargaining agreement provisions in Florida
collective bargaining agreements. The second question examines whether differences exists
between the collective bargaining agreement provisions present and their school district’s
demographics. Each question is examined using qualitative and quantitative methodology.
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Chapter Three is organized into six sections: research procedures, school district
background, research design, data collection measures, data analysis, and summary. Research
procedures explore the way data was used in this mixed-methods study. Florida’s diversity and
unique characteristics help data users make connections about the school district such as district
size, district locale, and district grade which will all be explored in the section on background of
the school districts. Research design discusses the mixed-methods theory used to design the
research. Data collection describes what was done to obtain the 67 Florida public school’s
collective bargaining agreements, the enrollment, locale, and district grades. Data analysis
describes the way in which the research questions were addressed. The final section of Chapter
Three, the summary, is a wrap up of all the sections presented in Chapter Three.

Procedures in the Research Study
For this mixed-methods study, collective bargaining agreements from 2015-2016 in 66
out of 67 regular3 public school districts in Florida were examined. Sixty-one of the 67
collective bargaining agreements were available on either the school districts’ website or the
school districts’ local teacher association website. Five of the 67 collective bargaining
agreements were obtained by calling and/or e-mailing either local teacher associations or school
boards. One of the 67 collective bargaining agreements was not able to be obtained by internet
search, phone call, or e-mail. For this study, particularly it was decided to look only at Florida
collective bargaining agreements from 2015-2016 school year. The decision to focus on the

3

There are seven additional schools not governed by traditional CBAs: Four lab schools (operated by, Florida A &
M University, Florida Atlantic University, Florida State University, and the University of Florida), the Florida
School for the Death and Blind, Florida Virtual School, and Okeechobee Youth Development Center
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collective bargaining agreements being used during the 2015-2016 year came from the fact that
all of Florida’s 67 instructional collective bargaining agreements are multiyear contracts. The
duration of the collective bargaining agreement varies from district to district between two to
three years. Negotiations over a successor contract takes months and there is very little chance
that any important agreements will be reached during the first five to six months before the
contract expires (Lieberman, 1997).
All the collective bargaining agreements were downloaded and saved for analysis. To
determine the frequency of the provisions, present in each collective bargaining agreement, an
Excel chart was used to tally up the occurrence of eight (8) provisions in each of the 66
collective bargaining agreements. The eight provisions were placed across the top of the chart
and the 67 districts were placed along the side of the chart. The dissertation proposal was
submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida (UCF) for
approval. Upon approval, the researcher implemented the study as defined. To protect the
anonymity of the school districts involved, the researcher identified the districts as DIS #1, DIS
#2, etc.

Background of the School Districts
The population for this study was the 67 public school districts in the state of Florida.
The average district enrollment for the state of Florida is 42,045 students. Districts range in size
from 734 to 357,311 students. Of these 67 districts six (6) are City, thirteen (13) are town,
twenty (20) are Rural, and twenty-eight (28) are Suburban (National Center for Educartion
Statistics, 2016). These four types of areas, City, Town, Rural, and Suburban, represent four of
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the school locale code classification of all territory in the U.S. determined by The National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) (National Center for Education Statistics, 2017). School
locale codes characterizes the type of community where a school is located (National Center for
Education Statistics, 2017). Each area is divided into three subtypes, City and Suburban is based
on population size while Town and Rural is bases on proximity to urban areas (National Center
for Education Statistics, 2017). All the types of locales are either completely rural or urban by
definition of the U.S. Census Bureau (National Center for Education Statistics, 2016). The four
areas are divided into three subtypes. This information allows data users such as policymakers
support for analysis of the relationship between schools and the community which can potential
affect education (National Center for Education Statistics, 2017). Additionally, each school
district is assigned a letter grade of A, B, C, D, or F annually by the Florida Department of
Education, based on the district’s full-year enrolled students (Florida Department of Education,
2017). The district’s grade is measured using the same components as school grades. School
grades also use a scale of A, B, C, D, or F and includes up to eleven components (Florida
Department of Education, 2017).
A school grade may include up to eleven components. There are four achievement
components, four learning gains components, a middle school acceleration component, as well as
components for graduation rate and college and career acceleration (Florida Department of
Education, 2017). The four achievement components include student performance on statewide
standardized assessment in English Language Arts, Mathematics, Science, and Social Studies.
The four learning gains components are in English Language Arts, mathematics, as well as
learning gains for the lowest performing 25% of students in English Language Arts and
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Mathematics (Florida Department of Education, 2017). The middle school acceleration
component is based on the percentage of “eligible students who passed a high school level EOC
assessment or industry certification” (Florida Department of Education, 2017). The graduation
rate is based on an “adjusted cohort of ninth grade students and measures whether the students
graduate within four years” (Florida Department of Education, 2017). The college and career
acceleration component is based on the “percentage of graduates from the graduation rate cohort
who earned a score on an acceleration examination or a grade in a dual enrollment course that
qualified students for college credit or earned an industry certification” (Florida Department of
Education, 2017). Each component can earn up to 100 points each which is added together and
divided by the total number of points to determine the percentage of points earned (Florida
Department of Education, 2017).

Research Design
A mixed method study uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches in the same
study (Frankel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015; Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009). The purpose of using a
mixed method approach is to build upon the data by gathering more data than was able to by
using a single approach (Frankel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015; Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009). Going
beyond one approach method allows the two approach to work together and build upon the
strengths of each (Frankel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015; Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009). The key to a
mixed method study is to combine the elements of methods in a way that makes the best sense
for the study (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009).
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There are three types of common mixed research design: The Qual-quan model, the
QUAN-qual model, and the QUAN-QUAL model (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009). In the
exploratory mixed methods design or QUAL-quan model, qualitative data is considered more
deeply and collected first, then quantitative data is collected (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009). The
explanatory mixed methods design or QUAN-qual model is opposite of the QUAL-quan.
Quantitative data is considered more deeply and collected first, then qualitative data is collected
(Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009). The last method is the triangulation mixed methods design or
QUAN-QUAL model. The data is weighed evenly and collected simultaneously (Gay, Mills, &
Airasian, 2009).
This study most closely resembles the QUAUL-quan model. Qualitative data was
collected first through content analysis. Qualitative research looks deeply into phenomena to
determine the patterns of meaning that emerge from data gathered (Lunenburg & Irby, 2008).
Content analysis is a qualitative research technique that was used in this study to help interpret
meaning from the content of text data to determine the patterns of meaning. “Research using
qualitative content analysis focuses on the characteristics of language as communication with
attention to the content or contextual meaning of the text” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278).
The purpose of qualitative content analysis is to classify text into shared categories by extend
beyond counting words and examining language intensely (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This is
referred to as coding. Coding in qualitative studies is “The analytical process through which data
are fractured, conceptualized and integrated to form theory…When coding a sentence or
paragraph, the coder tries to capture succinctly the major idea brought out by the sentence or
paragraph” (Frankel et al., 2015, p. 434). This study aligns with those perspectives by
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classifying large amounts of text (collective bargaining agreements) into eight provisional
categories. To that end, content analysis involved seven specific steps to be taken for analyzing
qualitative data. Table 6 is as follows:
Table 6: Key Aspects of Qualitative Content Analysis
Content Analyses’
Formulating research questions

Selecting a sample
Defining categories
Outlining the coding process
Implementing the coding process
Determining trustworthiness
Analyzing the results of the coding process

Action Taken in Research
Two questions were formulated to be
answered in this study:
1.To what extent are collective bargaining
agreement provisions present in Florida’s
collective bargaining agreements?
2. How does the presence of collective
bargaining agreement provisions impact
demographical indicators of Florida school
districts (i.e. district size, district
performance, district locale)?
67 Florida regular public school collective
bargaining agreements were analyzed
Eight (8) provisions were applied
Codes or themes emerged while reading the
67 collective bargaining agreements
Frequency count of the eight (8) provisions in
the 67 collective bargaining agreements
Credibility of the collective bargaining
agreement attained
Quantifying and/or qualifying the eight (8)
provisions present and absent as well as
crosstabulations on these eight (8) provisions

There are three distinct approaches to content analysis, conventional, directed, and summative
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In conventional content analysis, coding categories emerge directly
from the text data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Directed approach analysis uses an existing theory
or relevant research findings as guidance for initial codes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Summative
content analysis involves counting and comparison (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Determining
which of the three approaches to use varies based on the interests of the researcher and the
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problem being studied (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This study most closely resembles summative
content analysis.
Summative content analysis starts with identifying and tallying certain words or
content in text with the purpose of understanding (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This study aligns
with the perspectives offered by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) as it is inclusive of eight selected
provisions to identify and quantify in Florida’s collective bargaining agreements to explore usage
rather than infer meaning. This is referred to as a manifest content analysis because words were
reviewed without having to decode their meaning (Frankel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015). This starts
with a qualitative study because it is summative in nature and goes beyond quantifying to include
latent content analysis. “Latent content analysis refers to the process of interpretation of
content” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283). If the analysis stopped at the frequency of
provisions then this research would be quantitative, however the analysis goes on to examine the
provisions based on district size, district performance, and district locale. Hence this research
design used a summative approach to qualitative content analysis.
Once the qualitative data has been collected, the next phase of collecting quantitative data
is then collected. With the Qual-quan method, quantitative techniques are used with the data
derived from the qualitative analysis (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009). Once the data is analyzed
qualitatively, the data is reported based on the frequency of the eight selected provisions.
Crosstabulations were run to determine how the presences of desirable collective bargaining
agreements provisions vary according to district size, district performance, and district locale.
Cross-tabulation, also known as a contingency table or cross tabs, is a method to
quantitatively analyze variables that are grouped together to understand the correlation between
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multiple variables (Frankel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015). A cross-tabulation matrix table allows for
descriptively presenting the relationship between two variables (Green & Salkind, 2008).
Descriptive statistics was used as a data analysis technique to meaningfully describe data in a
numerical graph (Frankel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015).
The understanding gained through this investigation will provides useful information to
policymakers and practitioners in the state and provide the framework to determine ways to more
efficiently and effectively generate collective bargaining agreement provisions. This purpose of
the study aligns with the goal of content analysis, which is to “provide knowledge and
understanding of the phenomenon under study” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1278).

Data Collection Measures
As part of the data collection measures, collective bargaining agreements from sixtyseven Florida school districts from the 2015-2016 school year were used. Sixty-one of the 67
collective bargaining agreements were available on either the school districts’ website or the
school districts’ local teacher association website. Five (5) of the 67 collective bargaining
agreements were obtained by calling and/or e-mailing either local teacher associations or school
boards. DIS #40 does not have a teacher association website and the DIS #40 district school
board website did not have the collective bargaining agreement available. The researcher
attempted to call and e-mail using the information from the FEA website and human resources of
DIS #40 District School Board but was unsuccessful.
The school districts’ locale codes for common core data were downloaded from the
National Center for Education Statistics website (National Center for Education Statistics, 2016).
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There were 12 locale codes: large, midsize, and small city, large, midsize, and small suburban,
fringe, distant, and remote town, and fringe, distant, and remote rural (NCES Locale
Classifications and Criteria, 2018). For the purposes of this study, the researcher collapsed the
12 locale codes into their 4 major categories and assigned numerical values to them to aid in
analysis. For analysis purposes, the locale codes were recoded as 1 (city), 2 (suburb), 3 (town),
and 4 (rural).
The 2016-2017 state assigned districts grades were downloaded from the Florida
Department of Education website (Florida Department of Education, 2018). For analysis
purposes, the school district grades were recoded as 1 (school district grade D), 2 (school district
grade C), 3 (school district grade B), and 4 (school district grade A). The 2016-2017 enrollment
was downloaded from the Florida Department of Education website (Florida Department of
Education, 2018). Frequencies for enrollment were computed to identify four equal-sized
quartiles for re-coding enrollment values into a categorical variable. For analysis purposes
enrollment was categorized into four quartiles: 1 to 4,905 (quartile 1), 4,906 to 12,929 (quartile
2), 12,930 to 43,039 (3rd quartile) and 43,0040 to 35, 7311 (4th quartile). Locale codes, district
grades, and enrollment were given assigned codes to make categorical variables. The locale
codes, district grades, and enrollment data sets were then merged into a single data set. The data
set was entered into an Excel spreadsheet which was then uploaded into SPSS for analysis.

Data Analysis
The 66 contracts were analyzed inductively, meaning “immersion in the details and specifics of
the data to discover important categories, dimensions, and interrelationships” (Frankel, Wallen,
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& Hyun, 2015, p. 426). The Florida contracts contents were analyzed to discover links between
the eight (8) provisions and the contracts. The researchers identified eight desirable provisions
based on relevant extant research to identify from the 67 collective bargaining agreements
(Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014). That earlier study drew from the extant literature to
identify 40 salient collective bargaining agreement provisions, grouped into eight (8) categories.
These provisions reflect topics/issues receiving considerable attention in the press and teacher
labor literature. For the current project, eight (8) provisions were selected, representing six of
the eight categories. The researcher selected the provisions that teachers would be interested to
learn about because of the importance and concern of the provisions in instructional collective
bargaining agreements. One category was a single question that did not lend itself to the planned
analysis and, because maternity leave is regulated by Florida statutes, this category was not used.
To determine the frequency of the provisions present in each collective bargaining agreement, an
Excel chart was used to tally up the occurrence of 8 provisions in each of the 66 collective
bargaining agreements. The data was then looked at using the frequency statistics for the state as
a whole and, via crosstabs, across district categories with the intent of identifying meaningful
patterns.
To answer research question one, eight desirable provisions were identified based on
relevant extant research (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014). That earlier study drew from
the extant literature to identify 40 salient collective bargaining agreement provisions, grouped
into eight categories. These eight categories created the eight provisions for this research study.
For the current study, eight provisions were selected, representing six of the eight provision
category groups found in the Goldhaber, Lavery and Theobald (2014) study. The eight
75

categories in their study were: accessibility; association; hiring and transfers; workload;
evaluations; grievance; layoffs; and leave (Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald, 2014). The
researcher selected the provisions that teachers should be interested in because of the importance
and concern of these provisions in instructional collective bargaining agreements. These
provisions reflect topics/issues receiving considerable attention in the press and teacher labor
literature.
One category was a single question that did not lend itself to the planned analysis and
because layoffs are regulated by Florida statutes, this category was not used. The eight
provisions that were selected for use in this study were as follows:

1. Does the district pay for release time for negotiations for union members?
2. Does CBA require that districts post all certificated vacancies/make them available to
teachers in the district?
3. Does the CBA specify a given length of the school day?
4. Are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory (needs improvement)
performance evaluation?
5. Does the CBA allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation?
6. May the teacher grieve disciplinary action?
7. Is seniority the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs?
8. Do factors other than seniority determine the order of layoffs?

All of the collective bargaining agreements were downloaded and saved for analysis. To
determine the frequency of the provisions present in each collective bargaining agreement, an
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Excel chart was used to tally up the occurrence of 8 provisions in each of the 66 collective
bargaining agreements. The eight provisions were placed across the top of the chart and the 67
districts were placed along the side of the chart. An identifiable marker of one (1) was given for
collective bargaining items present while a value of zero (0) was given for items not present.
Table 7 provides a matrix of the inclusion are non-inclusion of provisions of collective
bargaining agreements. Table 7 is as follows:
Table 7: Matrix of District and Provisions
District
DIS 1
DIS 2
DIS 3
DIS 4
DIS 5
DIS 6
DIS 7
DIS 8
DIS 9
DIS 10
DIS 11
DIS 12
DIS 13
DIS 14
DIS 15
DIS 16
DIS 17
DIS 18
DIS 19
DIS 20
DIS 21
DIS 22
DIS 23
DIS 24
DIS 25

PRO 1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0

PRO2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

PRO3

PRO4

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
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PRO5
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0

PRO6
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0

PRO7
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1

PRO8
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0

District
DIS 26
DIS 27
DIS 28
DIS 29
DIS 30
DIS 31
DIS 32
DIS 33
DIS 34
DIS 35
DIS 36
DIS 37
DIS 38
DIS 39
DIS 40
DIS 41
DIS 42
DIS 43
DIS 44
DIS 45
DIS 46
DIS 47
DIS 48
DIS 49
DIS 50
DIS 51
DIS 52
DIS 53
DIS 54
DIS 55
DIS 56
DIS 57
DIS 58
DIS 59
DIS 60
DIS 61
DIS 62
DIS 63

PRO 1

PRO2

PRO3

PRO4

PRO5

PRO6

PRO7

PRO8

1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0

1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0

1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1

1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1

1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1

0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
0

0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1

1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
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District

PRO 1

DIS 64
DIS 65
DIS 66
DIS 67

0
0
0
0

PRO2
1
1
1
1

PRO3

PRO4

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

PRO5
1
1
0
1

PRO6
1
1
1
0

PRO7

PRO8

1
0
0
0

0
1
0
1

Table 7 was used to determine the percentage of districts’ collective bargaining agreements that
contained each of the eight (8) provisions. The Excel chart was uploaded to SPSS for analysis.
Such approach remained consistent with the Hsieh and Shannon (2005) summative content
analysis process.
To answer research question one, frequency statistics were calculated for all eight (8)
desirable characteristics. Information from the aforementioned table was inputted in the Excel
chart and uploaded to SPSS analysis. To answer research question two, crosstabulations were
run to determine how the presences of desirable collective bargaining agreements provisions
vary according to district size, district performance, and district locale. Cross-tabulation is a
matrix table that allows for descriptively presenting the relationship between two variables
(Green & Salkind, 2008). The same 8 provisions were disaggregated based on district size,
performance, and locale. Each of the three charts were set up with the four categories placed
across the top of the columns of the chart and with the percentage within district grade below the
columns for present and not present collective bargaining items.

79

Summary of the Methods
Chapter Three provided information about the background of the school districts, the
research design, the research procedures, and data collection measures and analyses of the
research and the research questions. Florida’s 67 public school districts were chosen for the
study population because of Florida’s unique enrollment characteristics. The 67 collective
bargaining agreements used were taken from each school district’s website. The Florida
contracts contents were analyzed to discover links between the eight (8) provisions and the
contracts. To determine the frequency of the provisions present in each collective bargaining
agreement, an Excel chart was used to tally up the occurrence of eight (8) provisions in each of
the 66 collective bargaining agreements. All of these components of the research methods have
offered insight into the strategies necessary to conduct an important study.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH FINDINGS
This study investigated the prevalence among 67 Florida school district collective
bargaining agreements (CBAs) of provisions identified in extant research as desirable for
teachers, and to describe their distribution among different categories of school districts in
Florida. The purpose of this mixed-methods study is as follows: (1) determine the extent, if any,
to which collective bargaining agreement provisions differ according to eight selected provisions
among Florida public school district collective bargaining agreements, and (2) identify and
describe how the presence or absence of these selected collective bargaining agreement
provisions impact demographical indicators of Florida school districts (i.e. district size, district
performance, district locale). This chapter presents the results of the data analysis for these two
stated research questions.
Both frequency and crosstabulation have been reported. The presentation of the findings
is organized by the two research questions. Frequency statistics were used to answer research
question one: To what extent, if any, do collective bargaining agreement provisions differ
according to eight selected provisions among Florida public school district collective bargaining
agreements? To answer research question two, crosstabulations were employed to determine
how the presence of desirable collective bargaining agreement elements varies according to key
variables of district size, district performance, and district locale. The eight selected CBA
provisions were disaggregated based on those key aforementioned variables, resulting in three
crosstabulation tables for each provision. In all cases, the three crosstabulation tables illustrate
provisions that are present and provisions that are not present in the collective bargaining
agreements categorized by district grade, district locale, and district enrollment.
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It is important to note that attempts were made in SPSS to determine whether or not
relationships existed between the districts’ grade, locale, enrollment, and the eight provisions.
The statistical tests of Pearson R Correlation, Regression, Spearman Correlation, Mann-Whitney
U, Chi-Square, t-test were all utilized. It was determined that because there were only two
categories for the provisions, correlation testing would not work. The distribution of the size
was not normal for a t-test and the researcher violated the assumptions for a t-test; therefore, a
Mann-Whitney U test was run in SPSS. Mann-Whitney test was used to analyze the relationship
between school grades and provisions since the dependent variables (provisions) are categorical,
and the independent variable (grade) is ordinal. The researcher reclassified the enrollment table
to match the four categories of the other two tables (grade and locale) and ran a Mann-Whitney
U test for the statistics based on the data in the table. The Mann Whitney U test was run two
different ways, continuous and classified; the results were the same using either method. For
testing local and provisions, the researcher used a Chi-squared test, since locale is a nominal
variable. The results of the aforementioned tests indicated that there were no significant or
statistical differences between the districts’ grade, locale, and enrollment and the eight
provisions.
Eight selected provisions were chosen from the identifed 40 collective barganing
provisions reported by Goldhaber, Lavery, and Theobalds (2014). They are as follows:

1. Does the district pay for release time for negotiations for union members?
2. Does CBA require that districts post all certificated vacancies/make them available to
teachers in the district?
3. Does the CBA specify a given length of the school day?
4. Are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory (needs improvement)
performance evaluation?
82

5.
6.
7.
8.

Does the CBA allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation?
May the teacher grieve disciplinary action?
Is seniority the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs?
Do factors other than seniority determine the order of layoffs?

These aforementioned provisions provide a guided structure for examining data associated with
this mixed-methods study. To respond to the overall research questions, there are eight different
frequency tables presented in response to question one and in response to each of the eight
selected provisions. There are 24 tables presented in response to question number two. The
tables provide a clear and comprehensive presentation of the results of the data analysis.

Collective Bargaining Agreements and Florida Public School Districts
The first research question in this study, to what extent, if any, do collective bargaining
agreement provisions differ according to eight selected provisions among Florida public school
district collective bargaining agreements, focuses on the presence of desirable CBA elements in
CBAs for the state as whole. Eight desirable provisions were selected for analysis in 66 of 67
CBAs in Florida. A categorical value of one was given for collective bargaining items present
while a value of zero was given for items not present. Analyses of qualitative data suggests the
emerging themes of process-oriented approach and results-driven outcomes.
The process-oriented approach themes indicate those provisions in which an action needs
to take place because it is developmental to the organization. Those processes are most evident
in the sub-themes of time, opportunity, and politics. These are all interactions that will take
place in a school as part of the school’s function. On the other hand, the results-driven
outcomes themes are indicative of outcomes of what has already taken place based on the
process-oriented provisions. These processes are most evident in the sub-themes of economics,
83

performance, and equity. These are all interactions that have taken place in a school as part of
the school’s function. The primary difference between these two approaches is with the processoriented approach, desirable changes have not yet occurred, but with the results-driven approach,
these outcomes have already occurred in the past. To that end, it is important to consider, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, the implications of collective bargaining agreements for public
school districts.
Table 8 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision one, release time for negotiations. Provision one asks, does the district pay
for release time for negotiations for union members? Table 8 is as follows:
Table 8: Frequency Table for Provision Number One (Release Time for Negotiations)

Valid

Missing
Total

Frequency

Percent

Not Present
Present in CBA

44
22

65.7
32.8

Total
System

66
1
67

98.5
1.5
100.0

Valid
Percent
66.7
33.3

Cumulative
Percent
66.7
100.0

100.0

Frequency statistics were calculated to determine the presence and absence of provision one in
all 66 collective bargaining agreements. The majority do not pay for release time for
negotiations. The number of CBAs that did not contain provision one was 44 out of 66 or
66.7%. The number of CBAs that did contain provision one was 22 out of 66 or 33.3%. Each of
the 66 collective bargaining agreements were also reviewed qualitatively using a summative
content analysis to determine if the district pays for release time for negotiations for union
members. As the 66 collective bargaining agreements were examined, six emerging themes
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were developed and classified into shared categories. Qualitatively, provision one’s emerging
themes captured by the text were tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach
(i.e. time, opportunity, politics) and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. economic, equity). The
process-oriented approach consists of three sub-process actions that will take place. Provision
one raises the question of being equitable and allowing educators the opportunity to take the time
to engage in a political process of negotiations and if the school will pay for the substitute
teacher out of its own funds.
Provision two asks, do collective bargaining agreements require that districts post all
certificated vacancies/make them available to teachers in the district? Table 9 presents the
results showing the number of collective bargaining agreements containing provision two
(posting of certificated vacancies). Table 9 is as follows:
Table 9: Frequency Table for Provision Number Two (Posting of Certificated Vacancies)

Valid

Missing
Total

Not Present
Present in CBA
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

2
64
66
1
67

3.0
95.5
98.5
1.5
100.0

Valid
Percent
3.0
97.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
3.0
100.0

To determine the presence and absence of provision two in all 66 collective bargaining
agreements frequency statistics was calculated. As indicated by Table 9, most districts do
require such notification/posting. The number of contracts that did not contain provision two
was recorded as only two out of 66 or 3% of CBAs. The number of CBAs which contained
provision two was 64 out of 66, or 97%. A qualitative method was used for each of the 66
collective bargaining agreements, specifically, a summative content analysis to determine if
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districts post all certificated vacancies, i.e., make them available to teachers in the district. As
the content of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were interpreted, six themed categories
were formed. Provision two fits into three of the six qualitative themed categories, opportunity,
politics, and equity. There are three emerging themes captured by the text for provision two
which are tied to the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. opportunity, politics)
and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. equity). Provision two asks if the district would be
competitive by posting opportunities for educators. The political influence is asserted when
schools do not want to post or limit the duration of their posted opportunities to avoid losing
teachers.
Table 10 presents the results for provision three in all 66 collective bargaining
agreements. Provision three asks, does the collective bargaining agreement specify a given
length of the school day? Table 10 is as follows:
Table 10: Frequency Table for Provision Number Three (Length of School Day)

Valid

Missing
Total

Not Present
Present in CBA
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

4
62
66
1
67

6.0
92.5
98.5
1.5
100.0

Valid
Percent
6.1
93.9
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
6.1
100.0

To determine the presence and absence of provision two in all 66 collective bargaining
agreements, frequency statistics were calculated. Almost all the CBAs specified the given length
of the school day or teacher day. Table 10 illustrates the results showing that 62 out of 66 or
93.9% of the CBAs include a teacher work day or school day provision. Only four out of 66 or

86

6.1% of CBAs did not contain provision three. A qualitative review of the 66 collective
bargaining agreements were reviewed using a summative content analysis to determine if
districts specify a given length of the school day. As the 66 collective bargaining agreements
were analyzed, six themed categories emerged. Provision three’s qualitative emerging themes
captured by the text was tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. time)
and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. performance). Provision three is concerned with posting
the length of time a teacher is expected to perform in a school day.
Table 11 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision four. Provision four asks, are there consequences for receiving a
negative/unsatisfactory, needs improvement, performance evaluation? Table 11 is as follows:
Table 11: Frequency Table for Provision Number Four (Consequences for Performance)

Valid

Missing
Total

Not Present
Present in CBA
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

28
38
66
1
67

41.8
56.7
98.5
1.5
100.0

Valid
Percent
42.4
57.6
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
42.4
100.0

Frequency statistics were calculated to determine the presence or absence of provision four in all
66 collective bargaining agreements. A total of 28 or 42.4% of CBAs did not contain this
provision and 38 or 57.6% did. Table 11 illustrates the results for provision four. Each of the 66
collective bargaining agreements were reviewed qualitatively using a summative content analysis
to determine if districts have consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory, needs
improvement, performance evaluation. Six themes emerged while reading the 66 collective
bargaining agreements. Qualitatively, provision four’s emerging themes, captured by the text,
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was tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. politics) and the resultsoriented outcomes (i.e. performance, equity). Provision four is concerned with the handling of
performance (equity) which ties in with the politics of why a school might or might not have this
provision.
Provision five asks, does the CBA allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a
negative evaluation? Table 12 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining
agreements that contained provision five, appeal of negative evaluation. Table 12 is as follows:
Table 12: Frequency Table for Provision Number Five (Appeal of Negative Evaluation)

Valid

Missing
Total

Not Present
Present in CBA
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

28
38
66
1
67

41.8
56.7
98.5
1.5
100.0

42.4
57.6
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
42.4
100.0

To determine the presence and absence of provision two in all 66 collective bargaining
agreements frequency statistics were calculated. Table 12 reports that 28 or 42.4% of collective
bargaining agreements did not allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation and 38
or 57.6% allowed it. A summative content analysis was used for each of the 66 collective
bargaining agreements to determine qualitatively if districts allow for teachers to rebut or
appeal a negative evaluation. As the collective bargaining agreements were examined, six
emerging themes were developed and classified into shared categories. There are three emerging
themes captured by the text for provision five which was tied with the broader theme of the
process-oriented approach (i.e. opportunity, politics) and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e.
performance, equity). Provision five asks if teachers would have the equitable opportunity to
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appeal a negative performance evaluation. Politics is again involved because challenges emerge
whenever administration is approached in an adverse manor.
Table 13 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision five, grieve disciplinary action. Provision six asks, may the teacher grieve
disciplinary action? Table 13 is as follows:
Table 13: Frequency Table for Provision Number Six (Grieve Disciplinary Action)

Valid

Missing
Total

Not Present
Present in CBA
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

29
37
66
1
67

43.3
55.2
98.5
1.5
100.0

Valid
Percent
43.9
56.1
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
43.9
100.0

Frequency statistics was calculated to determine the presence and absence of provision six in all
66 collective bargaining agreements. Twenty-nine or 43.9% of CBAs did not allow teachers to
grieve disciplinary action and 37 or 56.1% of CBAs allowed for grievances. A summative
content analysis was used as a qualitative method for each of the 66 collective bargaining
agreements to determine if districts allow for teachers to grieve disciplinary action. As the 66
collective bargaining agreements were examined, six emerging themes were developed and
classified into shared categories. Provision six’s emerging themes captured by the text was tied
with opportunity, politics, performance and equity. The broader theme of the process-oriented
approach (i.e. opportunity, politics) and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. performance, equity).
Provision six questions if a teacher would have the equitable opportunity to grieve disciplinary
action that was based on their performance. Politics is once again involved because a debate is
involved challenging administration.
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Table 14 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision seven, order of layoffs. Provision seven asks, is seniority the primary factor
that determines the order of layoffs? Table 14 is as follows:
Table 14: Frequency Table for Provision Number Seven (Order of Layoffs)

Valid

Missing
Total

Not Present
Present in CBA
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

45
21
66
1
67

67.2
31.3
98.5
1.5
100.0

Valid
Percent
68.2
31.8
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
68.2
100.0

Frequency statistics were calculated to determine the presence and absence of provision seven in
all 66 collective bargaining agreements. Table 14 reports that, out of 66 CBAs, 45 or 68.2% of
CBAs do not allow for seniority to be considered the number one factor in layoffs. Each of the
66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed qualitatively using a summative content
analysis to determine if seniority is the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs in a
district. As the content of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were interpreted, six
categories were formed. Provision seven fits into two of the six themed categories, time and
politics. Provision seven’s qualitative emerging themes captured by the text was tied with the
broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. time, politics) and results-oriented outcome
(i.e. equity). Provision seven is concerned with if a teacher’s time spent in the classroom
determines the order of layoffs. Politics is involved because it is debatable what the fair
(equitable) way to determine layoffs is.
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Provision eight asks, do factors other than seniority determine the order of layoffs? Table
14 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained
provision eight, other order of layoffs. Table 15 is as follows:

Table 15: Frequency Table for Provision Number Eight (Other Order of Layoffs)

Valid

Missing
Total

Not Present
Present in CBA
Total
System

Frequency

Percent

18
48
66
1
67

26.9
71.6
98.5
1.5
100.0

Valid
Percent
27.3
72.7
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
27.3
100.0

To determine the presence and absence of provision two in all 66 collective bargaining
agreements, frequency statistics was calculated. Table 15 reports that out of 66 CBAs, 48 or
72.7% of CBAs had factors other than seniority as the primary factor in determining the order of
layoffs. Some CBAs had a list of other factors that were to be considered, with seniority being
the most important factor in some. Eighteen total or 27.3% of the CBAs did not include factors
other than seniority to determine the order or layoffs. A summative content analysis, a
qualitative method was used for each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements to determine if
districts post all certificated vacancies/make them available to teachers in the district. As the 66
collective bargaining agreements were examined, six emerging themes were developed and
classified into shared categories. Qualitatively, provision eight’s emerging themes, captured by
the text was tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. Politics) and the
results-oriented outcomes (i.e. equity). Provision eight asks what are other factors that determine
the order of layoffs. Provision eight is political because the equitable way to deal with the topic
of layoffs is debatable.
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Collectively, when considering the collective bargaining agreement provisions and their
implications with the aforementioned themes and sub-themes, following below in Table 16 is the
visual representation of those connections:

Results Driven
Outcomes

Process-Oriented Approach

Table 16: Collective Bargaining Provision of Themes and Sub-Themes
Pro

Pro

Pro

Pro

Pro

Pro

Pro

Pro

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Time

X

X

Opportunity

X

X

Politics

X

X

Economic

X

Performance
Equity

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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X

X

X

X

Most provisions tied in with the process-oriented approach with politics having the most
connections with the eight provisions. The only provision that did not tie in with politics was
provision three (length of school day). The theme with the least amount of provisions related
was economics which only tied in with provision one (release time for negotiations). The two
broad categories of themes, (process-oriented approach and results driven outcomes) help
categorize the eight provisions in this study and make sense of their categorization by
recognizing their correlation and how they play off one another.

Collective Bargaining Agreements and Demographical Indicators
Research question two asks, how does the presence or absence of the selected collective
bargaining agreement provisions impact demographical indicators of Florida school districts (i.e.
district size, district performance, district locale)? Research question two focuses on the
presence or absence of provisions in collective bargaining agreements according to district size,
district performance, and district locale.
To answer research question two, crosstabulations were run to determine how the
prevalence of the same eight desirable collective bargaining elements in question one vary
according to district size, district performance, and district locale. There are 24 crosstabulation
charts, three charts (district size, district performance, and district locale) for each of the eight
provisions.
Provision one asks, does the district pay for release time for negotiations for union
members? Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the
data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision one. Crosstabulations were
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run to determine how the presence of provision one (release time for negotiations) vary
according to district performance (grade). Table 17 presents the results for the number of
collective bargaining agreements that contained provision one (release time for negotiations)
according to district grade. Table 17 is as follows:

Table 17: Crosstabulation for Provision One by District Rating (Grade)
Q1 Not present
Present in CBA
Total

D
1
100.0%
0
0.0%
1
100.0%

Count
% within GRADE 17
Count
% within GRADE 17
Count
% within GRADE 17

C
11
64.7%
6
35.3%
17
100.0%

B
23
62.2%
14
37.8%
37
100.0%

A
9
81.8%
2
18.2%
11
100.0%

Total
44
66.7%
22
33.3%
66
100.0%

For provision number one, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on district
performance grade. Table 17 reports that there was one collective bargaining agreement for
performance grade D districts which did not contain provision one in the agreement and zero that
did. There were 17 collective bargaining agreements for district performance grade C schools.
For grade C, 11 out of 17 or 64.7% of the agreements did not contain provision one and six out
of 17 or 35.3% of grade C agreements contained provision one. For grade B, there were 37
agreements. Out of those 37 agreements, 23 or 62.2% agreements did not contain provision one
and 14 or 37.8% of grade B agreements contained provision one. Grade A had 11 agreements in
which 9 out of 11 or 81.8% did not contain provision one and two out of 11 or 18.2% of grade A
school agreements contained provision one.
Table 18 presents the results for the number of 66 collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision one (release time for negotiations) according to district locale. Provision
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one asks, does the district pay for release time for negotiation for union members? Table 18 is as
follows:
Table 18: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision One
Q1 Not present
Present in CBA
Total

City
4
66.7%
2
33.3%
6
100.0%

Count
% within Locale
Count
% within Locale
Count
% within Locale

Suburb Town
Rural
Total
19
5
16
44
67.9% 38.5% 84.2% 66.7%
9
8
3
22
32.1% 61.5% 15.8% 33.3%
28
13
19
66
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Question one, provision one data was used to analyze question two provision one by using
quantitative data for each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements. Crosstabulations were run
to determine how the presence of provision one (release time for negotiations) vary according to
district locale. Table 18 records that for city CBAs there were four or 66.7% of CBAs that did
not contained provision one and two or 33.3% of CBAs that did. For suburban, 19 or 67.9% of
CBAs contained did not contain provision one and nine or 32.1% of CBAs did. For town, five or
38.5% of CBAs did not contained provision one and eight or 61.5% of CBAs did. For rural, 16
or 84.2% of CBAs that did not contained provision one and three or 15.8% of CBAs that did.
Town CBAs had the highest percentage of CBAs in which the district pays for release time for
negotiation. Rural had the highest percentage of CBAs that did not contain provision one.
Table 19 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision one (release time for negotiations) according to district enrollment.
Provision one asks, does the district pay for release time for negotiation for union members?
Table 19 is as follows:
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Table 19: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision One
1- 4905
Q1 Not present
Present in CBA
Total

Count
% within Enrollment
Count
% within Enrollment
Count
% within Enrollment

11
73.3%
4
26.7%
15
100.0%

490612929
9
52.9%
8
47.1%
17
100.0%

1293043039
14
82.4%
3
17.6%
17
100.0%

43040357311
10
58.8%
7
41.2%
17
100.0%

Total
44
66.7%
22
33.3%
66
100.0%

Question one, provision one data was used with quantitative data for each of the 66 collective
bargaining agreements. To determine how the presence of provision one (release time for
negotiations) vary according to district enrollment, crosstabulations were run. Table 19 records,
66 out of 67 collective bargaining agreements were disaggregated based on enrollment for the
2016-2017 year. Table 19 records, for quartile one (1-4,905), there were 17 CBAs. Out of those
17 CBAs, nine or 52.9% did not contain provision one and eight or 47.1% did contain provision
one. There were 17 CBAs for quartile 2 (4,906-12,929). Out of those 17 contracts, 14 or 82.4%
did not contain provision one and 8 or 47.1% contained provision one. There were 17 CBAs for
quartile 3 (12,930-43,039). Out of those 17 contracts, 14 or 82.4% did not contain provision one
and 3 or 17.6% contained provision one. There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311).
Out of those 17 contracts, 10 or 58.8% did not contain provision one and 7 or 41.2% contained
provision one.
Provision two asks, does the collective bargaining agreement require that districts post all
certified vacancies/make them available to teachers in the district? Table 20 presents the results
for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained provision two (posting of
certificated vacancies) according to district grade. Table 20 is as follows:
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Table 20: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Two
Q2 Not present
Present in CBA
Total

D
C
B
Count
0
0
1
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 100.0% 2.7%
Count
1
17
36
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 100.0% 97.3%
Count
1
17
37
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

A
1
9.1%
10
90.9%
11
100.0
%

Total
2
3.0%
64
97.0%
66
100.0
%

All of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data derived
from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision two. To determine how the presence of
provision two (posting of certificated vacancies) vary according to district performance (grade),
crosstabulations were run. Table 20 records, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on
district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year. Table 20 records, there was one
collective bargaining agreement for performance grade D district that contained provision
number two and zero that did not. There were 17 CBAs for performance grade C districts that
all contained provision number two. There were 37 collective bargaining agreements for
performance B districts. Out of those 37 agreements, one or 2.7% did not contain provision two
and 36 or 97.3% contained provision two. There were 11 collective bargaining agreements for
performance-based A districts. Out of those 11, one or 9.1% did not contain provision number
two and 10 or 90.9% contained provision two.
Table 21 presents the results for the total number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision two (posting of certificated vacancies) according to district locale. Provision
two asks, does the collective bargaining agreement require that districts post all certified
vacancies/make them available to teachers in the district? Table 21 is as follows:
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Table 21: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Two
Q2 Not present
Present in
CBA
Total

City
Suburb Town
Rural
0
2
0
0
0.0%
7.1%
0.0%
0.0%
6
26
13
19
100.0% 92.9% 100.0% 100.0%
6
28
13
19
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Count
% within Locale
Count
% within Locale
Count
% within Locale

Total
2
3.0%
64
97.0%
66
100.0%

The 66 collective bargaining agreements were all reviewed quantitively using the data derived
from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision two. Crosstabulations were run to
determine how the presence of provision two, posting of certificated vacancies, vary according to
district locale. Table 21 records that for city CBAs all six contracts require vacancies to be
posted. For suburban CBAs, two or 7.1% of CBA do not require vacancies to be posted and 26
or 92.9% of CBAs require vacancies to be posted. For town, all 13 CBAs require vacancies to
be posted. For rural, all 19 CBAs require vacancies to be posted. All the CBAs in city, town,
and rural required vacancies to be posted and all but two CBAs in suburban contained provision
two.
Provision two asks, does the collective bargaining agreement require that districts post all
certified vacancies/make them available to teachers in the district? Table 22 presents the results
for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained provision two (posting of
certificated vacancies) according to district enrollment. Table 22 is as follows:
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Table 22: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Two
1- 4905
Q2 Not present

Present in
CBA
Total

Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment

490612929
0
0.0%

1293043039
1
5.9%

43040357311
1
5.9%

Total

15
17
100.0% 100.0%

16
94.1%

16
94.1%

64
97.0%

15
17
100.0% 100.0%

17
100.0%

17
100.0%

66
100.0%

0
0.0%

2
3.0%

Using the data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision two, each of the
66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively. To determine how the presence
of provision two (posting of certificated vacancies) vary according to district enrollment,
crosstabulations were run. For provision number two, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated
based on enrollment for the 2016-2017 year. Table 22 records, for quartile one (1-4,905), there
were 15 collective bargaining agreements and they all contained provision two. There were 17
CBAs for quartile 2 (4,906-12,929) that all contained provision two. There were 17 CBAs for
quartile 3 (12,930-43,039). Out of those 17 contracts, one or 5.9% did not contain provision two
and 16 or 94.1% contained provision two. There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311).
Out of those 17 contracts, 1 or 5.9% did not contain provision two and 16 or 94.1% contained
provision two. All of the CBAs in quartiles 1-2 and all but 2 contracts in quartiles 3-4 require
districts to post vacancies.
Table 23 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision three (length of school day) according to district performance (grade).
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Provision three asks, Does the collective bargaining agreements specify a given length of the
school day? Table 23 is as follows:
Table 23: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Three
Q3

Not present
Present in CBA

Total

D
C
B
A
Total
Count
0
1
3
0
4
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 5.9%
8.1%
0.0%
6.1%
Count
1
16
34
11
62
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 94.1% 91.9% 100.0% 93.9%
Count
1
17
37
11
66
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision three. Crosstabulations were run
to determine how the presence of provision three (length of school day) vary according to district
performance (grade). For provision number three, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based
on district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year. Table 23 records, there was one
CBA for performance grade D district that contained provision number three and zero that did
not. There were 17 collective bargaining agreements for performance grade C districts. Out of
those 17 agreements, one or 5.9% did not contain provision three and 16 or 94.1% contained
provision three. There were 37 collective bargaining agreements for performance B districts.
Out of those 37 contracts, 3 or 8.1% did not contain provision three and 34 or 91.9% contained
provision three. There were 11 CBAs for performance-based A districts which all contained
provision three. All of the CBAs in district grade D and A and all but one in district C and three
in district B specify the given length of the school or teacher work day.
Provision three asks, Does the collective bargaining agreements specify a given length of
the school day? Table 24 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements
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that contained provision three (length of school day) according to district performance (grade).
Table 24 is as follows:
Table 24: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Three
Q3

Not present
Present in CBA

Total

City
1
16.7%
5
83.3%
6
100.0%

Count
% within Locale
Count
% within Locale
Count
% within Locale

Suburb Town
Rural
Total
2
0
1
4
7.1%
0.0%
5.3%
6.1%
26
13
18
62
92.9% 100.0% 94.7% 93.9%
28
13
19
66
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Using the data derived from question one, provision three, each of the 66 collective bargaining
agreements were reviewed quantitively. Crosstabulations were run to determine how the
presence of provision three (length of school day) vary according to district locale. For provision
number three, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on locale code. Table 24 records that
there are six city CBAs and all but one specifies the length of the school day. For the 28
suburban CBAs, all but two specifies the length of the school day. All 13 town CBAs specifies
the length of the school day. For the 19 CBAs in rural, all but one contained provision three.
Only town CBA had all of their CBAs contain provision three.
Table 25 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision three according to district enrollment. Provision three asks, Does the
collective bargaining agreements specify a given length of the school day? Table 25 is as
follows:
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Table 25: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation Provision Three
1- 4905
Q3 Not present

Present in
CBA
Total

Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment

1293043039
3
17.6%

43040357311
0
0.0%

Total

0
0.0%

490612929
1
5.9%

15
100.0%

16
94.1%

14
82.4%

17
100.0%

62
93.9%

15
17
100.0% 100.0%

17
100.0%

17
100.0%

66
100.0%

4
6.1%

Question one, provision one qualitative data was used to analyze question two, provision three,
by using quantitative data for each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements. To determine
how the presence of provision three (length of school day) vary according to district enrollment,
crosstabulations were run. For provision number three, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated
based on enrollment for the 2016-2017 year. Table 25 records, for quartile one (1-4,905), there
were 15 CBAs and they all contained provision three. There were 17 CBAs for quartile 2
(4,906-12,929). Out of those 17, one or 5.9% did not contain provision three and 16 or 94.1%
contained provision three. There were 17 CBAs for quartile 3 (12,930-43,039). Out of those 17
contracts, 3 or 17.6% did not contain provision one and 14 or 82.4% contained provision three.
There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311) and they all contained provision three.
Quartile two had one CBA and quartile three had three CBAs that did not specify the length of
the school day while all of the CBAs in quartile one and four specified the length of the school
day.
Provision four asks, are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory
performance evaluation? Table 26 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining
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agreements that contained provision four (consequences for performance) according to district
performance (grade). Table 26 is as follows:
Table 26: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Four
Q4 Not present
Present in CBA
Total

D
C
B
A
Total
Count
1
7
17
3
28
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 41.2% 45.9% 27.7% 42.4%
Count
0
10
20
8
38
% within GRADE 17 0.0%
58.8% 54.1% 27.7% 57.6%
Count
1
17
37
11
66
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision four. Crosstabulations were run
to determine how the presence of provision four, consequences for performance, vary according
to district performance (grade). For provision number four, 66 out of 67 CBAs were
disaggregated based on district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year. Table 26
records, there was one collective bargaining agreement for performance grade D district that did
not contained provision number four and zero that did. There were 17 collective bargaining
agreements for performance grade C districts. Out of those 17 agreements, seven or 41.2% did
not contain provision four and 10 or 58.8% contained provision four. There were 37 collective
bargaining agreements for performance B districts. Out of those 37 contracts, 17 or 45.9% did
not contain provision four and 20 or 54.1% contained provision four. There were 11 CBAs for
performance based A districts. Out of those 11 agreements, three or 27.3% did not contain
provision number four and eight or 72.7% contained provision four. The results were rather
even throughout with only one contract in grade D that did not have a consequence for a negative
evaluation.
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Table 27 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision four, consequences for performance according to district performance
(grade). Provision four asks, are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory
performance evaluation? Table 27 is as follows:
Table 27: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Four
City
Suburb Town
Rural
Total
Q4 Not present
Count
2
10
6
10
28
% within Locale code 33.3% 35.7% 46.2% 52.6% 42.4%
Present in CBA Count
4
18
7
9
38
% within Locale code 66.7% 64.3% 53.8% 47.4% 57.6%
Total
Count
6
28
13
19
66
% within Locale code 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Question one, provision four qualitative data was used to analyze question two provision one by
using quantitative data for each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements. To determine how
the presence of provision four (consequences for performance) vary according to district locale,
crosstabulations were run. For provision number four, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated
based on locale code. Table 27 records, two or 33.3% of city CBAs did not contain provision
four while four or 66.7% of CBAs did. For suburban, 10 or 35.7% of CBAs did not contain
provision four and 18 or 64.3% of CBAs did. For town, 6 or 46.2% of CBAs did not contain
provision four and 7 or 53.8% of CBAs did. For rural, 10 or 52.6% of CBAs did not contain
provision four and nine or 47.4% of CBAs did. City had the highest percentage of CBAs that
had consequences for receiving a negative evaluation. Rural CBAs had the highest percentage of
CBAs that did not contain provision four.
Provision four asks, are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory
performance evaluation? Table 28 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining
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agreements that contained provision four (consequences for performance) according to district
performance (grade). Table 28 is as follows:
Table 28: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Four
1- 4905
Q4 Not present

Present in
CBA
Total

Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment

10
66.7%

490612929
6
35.3%

1293043039
7
17.6%

43040357311
5
29.4%

Total
28
42.4%

5
33.3%

11
64.7%

10
58.8%

12
70.6%

38
57.6%

15
17
100.0% 100.0%

17
100.0%

17
100.0%

66
100.0
%

Using the data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision four, each of the
66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitatively. Crosstabulations were run to
determine how the presence of provision four, consequences for performance, vary according to
district enrollment. For provision number four, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on
enrollment for the 2016-2017 year. Table 28 lists, for quartile one (1-4,905), there were 15
CBAs. Out of those 15 agreements, 10 or 66.7% did not contain provision number four and five
or 33.3% contained provision four. There were 17 CBAs for quartile two (4,906-12,929). Out
of those 17 agreements, six or 35.3% did not contain provision number four and 11 or 64.7%
contained provision four. There were 17 CBAs for quartile 3 (12,930-43,039). Out of those 17
contracts, 7 or 41.2% did not contain provision four and 10 or 58.8% contained provision four.
There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311). Out of those 17 contracts, five or 29.4%
did not contain provision four and 12 or 70.6% contained provision four. Quartile four had the
highest percentage of CBAs in a quartile that had consequences for a negative evaluation.
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Quartile one had the highest percentage of CBAs that did not have a consequence for a negative
evaluation.
Table 29 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision five, appeal of negative evaluation, according to district performance
(grade). Provision five asks, does the collective bargaining agreement allow for teachers to rebut
or appeal a negative evaluation? Table 29 is as follows:
Table 29: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Five
Q5

Not present

Present in CBA

Total

Count
% within GRADE
17
Count
% within GRADE
17
Count
% within GRADE
17

D
1
100.0%

C
5
29.4%

B
17
45.9%

A
5
45.5%

Total
28
42.4%

0
0.0%

12
70.6%

20
54.1%

6
54.5%

38
57.6%

1
17
37
11
66
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision five. To determine how the
presence of provision five, appeal of negative evaluation, vary according to district performance
(grade), crosstabulations were run. For provision number five, 66 out of 67 CBAs were
disaggregated based on district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year. Table 29
lists, there was one CBA for performance grade D district that did not contained provision
number five and zero that did. There were 17 CBAs for performance grade C districts. Out of
those 17 agreements, five or 29.4% did not contain provision five and 12or 70.6% contained
provision five. There were 37 CBAs for performance B districts. Out of those 37 contracts, 17
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or 45.9% did not contain provision five and 20 or 54.1% contained provision five. There were
11 CBAs for performance-based A districts. Out of those 11 agreements, five or 45.5% did not
contain provision number five and 8 or 72.7% contained provision five. C-grade district CBA
had the highest percentage of CBAs that allows teacher to appeal a negative evaluation.
Provision five asks, does the collective bargaining agreement allow for teachers to rebut
or appeal a negative evaluation? Table 30 presents the results for the number of collective
bargaining agreements that contained provision five (appeal of negative evaluation), according to
district locale. Table 30 is as follows:
Table 30: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Five
City
Suburb Town
Rural
Total
Count
3
12
6
7
28
% within Enrollment 50.0% 42.9% 46.2% 36.8% 42.4%
Present in CBA Count
3
16
7
12
38
% within Enrollment 50.0% 57.1% 53.8% 63.2% 57.6%
Total
Count
6
28
13
19
66
% within Enrollment 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Q5 Not present

Using the data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision five, each of the
66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively. Crosstabulations were run to
determine how the presence of provision five (appeal of negative evaluation) vary according to
district locale. For provision number five, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on
locale code. Table 30 lists, for city, three or 50% of CBAs did not contain provision five and
three or 50% of CBAs did. For suburban, 12 or 42.9% of CBAs did not contain provision five
and 16 or 57.1% of CBAs did. For town, six or 42.9% of CBAs did not contain provision five
and seven or 53.8% of CBAs did. For rural, seven or 36.8% of CBAs did not contain provision
five and 12 or 63.2% of CBAs did. Rural contained the highest percentage of CBAs that allows
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teacher to appeal negative evaluations. Town had the highest percentage of CBAs that did not
contain provision five.
Table 31 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision five according to district enrollment. Provision five asks, does the collective
bargaining agreement allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation? Table 31 is as
follows:
Table 31: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Five
1- 4905
Q5 Not present

Present in
CBA
Total

Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment

4
26.7%

490612929
9
52.9%

1293043039
8
47.1%

43040357311
7
41.2%

Total
28
42.4%

11
73.3%

8
47.1%

9
52.9%

10
58.8%

38
57.6%

15
17
100.0% 100.0%

17
100.0%

17
100.0%

66
100.0%

Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision five. To determine how the
presence of provision five (appeal of negative evaluation) vary according to district enrollment,
crosstabulations were run. For provision number five, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated
based on enrollment for the 2016-2017 year. Table 31 records, for quartile one (1-4,905), there
were 15 collective bargaining agreements. Out of those 15 agreements, four or 26.7% did not
contain provision number five and 11 or 73.3% contained provision five. There were 17 CBAs
for quartile 2 (4,906-12,929). Out of those 17 agreements, nine or 52.9% did not contain
provision number five and 8 or 47.1% contained provision five. There were 17 CBAs for
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quartile 3 (12,930-43,039). Out of those 17 contracts, eight or 47.1% did not contain provision
five and 9 or 52.9% contained provision five. There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,04035,7311). Out of those 17 contracts, seven or 41.2% did not contain provision five and 10 or
58.8% contained provision five. Quartile one contained the highest percentage of CBAs that
allowed teachers to appeal a negative evaluation.
Provision six asks, may the teacher grieve disciplinary action? Table 32 presents the
results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained provision six (grieve
disciplinary action) according to district performance (grade). Table 32 is as follows:
Table 32: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Six
D
C
B
A
Total
Count
1
6
17
5
29
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 35.3% 45.9% 45.5% 43.9%
Present in CBA Count
0
11
20
6
37
% within GRADE 17 0.0%
64.7% 54.1% 54.5% 56.1%
Total
Count
1
17
37
11
66
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Q6 Not present

Question one, provision six, qualitative data was used to analyze question two provision six by
using quantitative data for each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements. Crosstabulations
were run to determine how the presence of provision five (grieve disciplinary action) vary
according to district performance (grade). For provision number six, 66 out of 67 CBAs were
disaggregated based on district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year. There was
one CBA for performance grade D district that did not contained provision number six and zero
that did. Table 32 records, there were 17 collective bargaining agreements for performance
grade C districts. Out of those 17 agreements, 6 or 35.3% did not contain provision six and 11 or
64.7% contained provision six. There were 37 CBAs for performance B districts. Out of those
109

37 contracts, 17 or 45.9% did not contain provision six and 20 or 54.1% contained provision six.
There were 11 CBAs for performance-based A districts. Out of those 11 agreements, 5 or 45.5%
did not contain provision number six and six or 54.5% contained provision six. Grade C had the
highest percentage of CBAs that allows for teacher to grieve disciplinary action. The only
contract for grade D did not allow teacher to grieve disciplinary action making grade B the
second highest percentage of contracts without provision six.
Table 33 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision six according to district locale. Provision six asks, may the teacher grieve
disciplinary action? Table 33 is as follows:
Table 33: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Six
City
Suburb Town
Rural
Total
Q6 Not present
Count
4
9
5
11
29
% within Enrollment 66.7% 32.1% 38.5% 57.9% 43.9%
Present in CBA Count
2
19
8
8
37
% within Enrollment 33.3% 67.9% 61.5% 42.1% 56.1%
Total
Count
6
28
13
19
66
% within Enrollment 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision six. To determine how the
presence of provision six (grieve disciplinary action) vary according to district locale,
crosstabulations were run. For provision number six, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated
based on locale code. Table 33 records, for city four or 66.7% of CBAs that did not allow for
teachers to grieve disciplinary action and two or 33.3% of CBAs that did. For suburban, nine or
32.1% of CBAs that did not contain provision six and 19 or 67.9% of CBAs that did. For town,
five or 38.5% of CBAs that did not contained provision six and eight or 61.5% of CBAs that did.
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For rural, 11 or 57.9% of CBAs that did not contain provision six and eight or 42.1% of CBAs
that did. Suburb CBAs had the highest percentage of CBAs that allows teacher to grieve
disciplinary action. City has the highest percentage of CBAs that does not contain provision six.
Provision six asks, may the teacher grieve disciplinary action? Table 34 presents the
results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained provision six (grieve
disciplinary action) according to district enrollment. Table 34 is as follows:
Table 34: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Six
1- 4905
Q
6

Not present

Present in
CBA
Total

Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment

9
60.0%

490612929
7
41.2%

1293043039
7
47.2%

43040357311
6
35.3%

Total
29
43.9%

6
40.0%

10
58.8%

10
58.8%

11
64.7%

37
56.1%

15
17
100.0% 100.0%

17
100.0%

17
100.0%

66
100.0
%

Using the data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision six, each of the 66
collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively. Crosstabulations were run to
determine how the presence of provision five (grieve disciplinary action) vary according to
district enrollment. For provision number six, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on
enrollment for the 2016-2017 year. Table 34 records, for quartile one (1-4,905), there were 15
CBAs. Out of those 15 agreements, 9 or 60.0% did not contain provision six and six or 40.0%
contained provision six. There were 17 collective bargaining agreements for quartile two (4,90612,929). Out of those 17 agreements, seven or 41.2% did not contain provision six and 10 or
58.8% contained provision six. There were 17 CBAs for quartile 3 (12,930-43,039). Out of
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those 17 contracts, seven or 41.2% did not contain provision six and 10 or 58.8% contained
provision six. There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311). Out of those 17 contracts, 6
or 35.3% did not contain provision six and 11 or 64.7% contained provision six.
Table 35 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision seven, order of layoffs according to district performance (grade). Provision
seven asks, is seniority the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs? Table 35 is as
follows:
Table 35: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Seven
D
C
B
A
Total
Count
1
10
25
9
45
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 38.8% 67.6% 81.8% 68.2%
Present in CBA Count
0
7
12
2
21
% within GRADE 17 0.0%
41.2% 32.4% 18.2% 31.8%
Total
Count
1
17
37
11
66
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Q7 Not present

Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision seven. To determine how the
presence of provision five (order of layoffs) vary according to district performance (grade),
crosstabulations were run. For provision number seven, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated
based on district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year. Table 35 records, there was
one CBA for performance grade D district that did not contained provision number seven and
zero that did. There were 17 collective bargaining agreements for performance grade C districts.
Out of those 17 agreements, 10 or 58.8% did not contain provision seven and seven or 41.2%
contained provision seven. There were 37 CBAs for performance B districts. Out of those 37
contracts, 25 or 67.6% did not contain provision seven and 12 or 32.4% contained provision
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seven. There were 11 CBAs for performance-based A districts. Out of those 11 agreements, 9
or 81.8% did not contain provision number seven and two or 18.2% contained provision seven.
Provision seven asks, is seniority the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs?
Table 36 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained
provision seven, order of layoffs according to district locale. Table 36 is as follows:
Table 36: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Seven
Q7 Not present
Present in CBA
Total

Count
% within Enrollment
Count
% within Enrollment
Count
% within Enrollment

City
Suburb Town
Rural
Total
4
20
9
12
45
66.7% 71.4% 69.2% 63.2% 68.2%
2
8
4
7
21
33.3% 28.6% 30.8% 36.8% 31.8%
6
28
13
19
66
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Using the data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision seven, each of the
66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively. Crosstabulations were run to
determine how the presence of provision five (order of layoffs) vary according to district locale.
For provision number seven, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on locale code. Table
36 recorded, for city, four or 66.7% of CBAs did not contain provision seven and two or 33.3%
of CBAs did. For suburban, 20 or 71.4% of CBAs did not contain provision seven and eight or
28.6% of CBAs did. For town, nine or 69.2% of CBAs did not contain provision seven and four
or 30.8% of CBAs did. For rural, 12 or 63.2% of CBAs did not contain provision seven and
seven or 36.8% of CBAs did. Rural CBAs has the highest percentage of CBAs that had seniority
as the primary factor in layoffs. Suburb had the highest percentage of CBAs that did not contain
provision seven.
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Table 37 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision seven (order of layoffs) according to district enrollment. Provision seven
asks, is seniority the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs? Table 37 is as follows:
Table 37: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Seven
1- 4905
Q
7

Not present

Present in
CBA
Total

Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment

8
53.3%

490612929
14
82.4%

1293043039
12
70.6%

43040357311
11
64.7%

Total
45
68.2%

7
46.7%

3
17.6%

10
58.8%

6
35.3%

21
31.8%

15
17
100.0% 100.0%

17
100.0%

17
100.0%

66
100.0
%

Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision seven. According to district
enrollment, crosstabulations were run to determine how the presence of provision five, order of
layoffs, vary. For provision number seven, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on
enrollment for the 2016-2017 year. Table 37 recorded, for quartile one (1-4,905), there were 15
collective bargaining agreements. Out of the 15 agreements, 8 or 53.3% did not contain
provision seven and seven or 46.7% contained provision seven. There were 17 CBAs for
quartile 2 (4,906-12,929). Out of the 17 agreements, 14 or 82.4% did not contain provision
seven and 3 or 17.6 % did contain provision seven. There were 17 CBAs for quartile 3 (12,93043,039). Out of those 17 contracts, 12 or 70.6% did not contain provision seven and 5 or 29.4%
did contain provision seven. There were 17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311). Out of those
17 contracts, 11 or 64.7% did not contain provision seven and 6 or 35.3% contained provision
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seven. Quartile four contained the highest percentage of CBAs that did not have seniority as the
primary factor in layoffs.
Provision eight asks, do factors other than seniority determine the order or layoffs? Table
38 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained
provision eight, other order of layoffs, according to district performance (grade). Table 38 is as
follows:
Table 38: GRADE17 Crosstabulation for Provision Eight
D
C
B
A
Total
Count
0
4
14
0
18
% within GRADE 17 0.0%
23.5% 37.8%
0.0%
27.3%
Present in CBA Count
1
13
23
11
48
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 76.5% 62.2% 100.0% 72.7%
Total
Count
1
17
37
11
66
% within GRADE 17 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Q8 Not present

Question one, provision one, qualitative data was used to analyze question two provision one by
using quantitative data for each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements. Crosstabulations
were run to determine how the presence of provision five (other order of layoffs) vary according
to district performance (grade). For provision number eight, 66 out of 67 CBAs were
disaggregated based on district performance grades for the 2016-2017 school year. Table 38
records, there was one CBA for performance grade D district that contained provision number
eight and zero that did not. There were 17 CBAs for performance grade C districts. Out of those
17 agreements, 4 or 23.5% did not contain provision eight and 13 or 76.5% contained provision
eight. There were 37 CBAs for performance B districts. Out of those 37 contracts, 14 or 37.8%
did not contain provision eight and 23 or 62.2% contained provision eight. There were 11 CBAs
for performance-based A districts, and they all contained provision eight. Grade A has the
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highest percentage of CBAs that ha factors other than seniority as the primary factor in layoffs as
well as the one CBA for grade D.
Provision eight asks, do factors other than seniority determine the order or layoffs? Table
39 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that contained
provision eight, other order of layoffs, according to district locale. Table 39 is as follows:
Table 39: LOCALE Crosstabulation for Provision Eight
Q8 Not present

Present in CBA

Total

Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment

City
1
16.7%

Suburb
7
25.0%

Town
6
46.2%

Rural
4
21.1%

Total
18
27.3%

5
83.3%

21
75.0%

7
53.8%

15
78.9%

48
72.7%

6
28
13
19
66
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Each of the 66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively using the data
derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision seven. To determine how the
presence of provision five (other order of layoffs) vary according to district locale,
crosstabulations were run. For provision number eight, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated
based on locale code. Table 39 recorded, for city, one or 16.7% of CBAs did not contain
provision five and five or 83.3% of CBAs did. For suburban, seven or 25% of CBAs did not
contain provision eight and 21 or 75% of CBAs did. For town, six or 46.2% of CBAs did not
contain provision eight and seven or 53.8% did. For rural, four or 21.1% of CBAs did not
contain provision eight and 15 or 78.9% of CBAs did. City CBAs had the highest percentage of
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CBAs that had factors other than seniority determine the order or layoffs. Town CBAs had the
highest percentage of CBAs that did not contain provision eight.
Table 40 presents the results for the number of collective bargaining agreements that
contained provision eight, other order of layoffs, according to district enrollment. Provision
eight asks, do factors other than seniority determine the order or layoffs? Table 40 is as follows:
Table 40: Enrollment 2016-17 Crosstabulation for Provision Eight
1- 4905
Q8 Not present

Present in
CBA
Total

Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment
Count
% within
Enrollment

5
33.3%

490612929
4
23.5%

1293043039
4
23.5%

43040357311
5
29.4%

Total
18
27.3%

10
66.7%

13
76.5%

13
76.5%

12
70.6%

48
72.7%

15
17
100.0% 100.0%

17
100.0%

17
100.0%

66
100.0
%

Using the data derived from the qualitative analysis in question one, provision, eight, each of the
66 collective bargaining agreements were reviewed quantitively. Crosstabulations were run to
determine how the presence of provision five (other order of layoffs) vary according to district
enrollment. For provision number eight, 66 out of 67 CBAs were disaggregated based on
enrollment for the 2016-2017 year. For quartile one (1-4,905), there were 15 CBAs. Table 40
recorded, out of the 15 agreements, 5 or 33.3% did not contain provision eight and 10 or 66.7%
contained provision eight. There were 17 CBAs for quartile 2 (4,906-12,929). Out of the 17
agreements, 4 or 23.5% did not contain provision eight and 13 or 76.5% did contain provision
eight. There were 17 CBAs for quartile three (12,930-43,039). Out of those 17 contracts, 4 or
23.5% did not contain provision eight and 13 or 76.5% did contain provision eight. There were
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17 CBAs for quartile 4 (43,040-35,7311). Out of those 17 contracts, 5 or 29.4% did not contain
provision eight and 12 or 70.6% contained provision eight.

Summary of Chapter Four
Chapter Four provides a report of the data analysis methods used for the two stated
research questions. In this chapter, an introduction was given explaining the purpose of the
study and analysis and statistical tests that were to be discussed and in which order they would
be addressed. This was followed by a report on the attempts made in SPSS by the researcher to
determine whether relationships existed between the districts’ grade, locale, enrollment, and the
eight provisions. The results of the aforementioned tests indicated that there were no significant
differences between the districts’ grade, locale, and enrollment and the eight provisions.
Research question one, to what extent, if any, do collective bargaining agreement
provisions differ according to eight selected provisions among Florida public school district
collective bargaining agreements, focused on the presence of eight desirable collective
bargaining agreement elements in CBAs for the state of Florida as a whole. Eight desirable
provisions were analyzed in 66 of 67 collective bargaining agreements in Florida. The results
were presented using frequency statistic tables to show calculations and determine the presence
and absence of provisions in all 66 collective bargaining agreements.
Research question two, how does the presence or absence of the selected collective
bargaining agreement provisions impact demographical indicators of Florida school districts (i.e.
district size, district performance, district locale), focused on how the presence of desirable
collective bargaining agreement elements varied according to the key variables of district size,
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district performance, and district locale. The results were presented with three crosstabulation
tables for each of the eight provisions. These tables illustrated the provisions that were present
and provisions that were not present in the collective bargaining agreements categorized by
district grade, district locale, and district enrollment.
The following chapter presents a discussion of the findings, implications, and
recommendation for future research.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter Five consists of a summary of the study, discussion of the findings, implications
for practice, recommendations for further research, and conclusions. This chapter begins with a
summary of the study discussing the problem and purpose of this study, conceptual framework,
research questions, methodology, and major findings. Then a discussion of the findings
evaluates what the results of the study means. Finally, implications for practice, and
recommendations for future research are presented and discussed. Chapter Five provides
demonstrated analyses of public-school collective bargaining agreements, understanding of the
distribution among different categories of school districts in Florida, and their impact on public
school collective bargaining agreements.

Summary of the Study
To date, there has been limited information on Florida public school collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs), specifically regarding their similarities and unique aspects and content.
Research has overlooked what influences the provisions that end up in collective bargaining
agreements considering what research says about the influence collective bargaining agreements
have on a district. The impact that collective bargaining has may not be clear but what is clear is
that collective bargaining agreement provisions shape district policy (Strunk, 2011). Because of
the influence that collective bargaining agreements have on a district, unions need to ensure that
necessary steps are taken toward improving the process of collective bargaining.
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The purpose of this study was: 1) to determine the extent to which CBA provisions exist
within the master contracts of Florida teachers (2016-2017) and, 2) to determine the extent to
which, if any, collective bargaining provisions varies according to the school district (i.e. district
size, district performance, district locale). The understanding gained through this investigation
provides useful information for policymakers and practitioners in the state of Florida and offers
ways to more effectively generate collective bargaining agreement provisions.
Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald (2014) provisions involving the collective bargaining
agreements were used as the conceptual framework for examining the data in this study.
Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald’s (2014) 40 provisions which have received considerable
amount of attention by teacher or media literature were narrowed down into 8 selected provisions
from the identified 40 collective bargaining provisions. Those questions are as follows:

1. Does the district pay for release time for negotiations for union members?
2. Does CBA require that districts post all certificated vacancies/make them available to
teachers in the district?
3. Does the CBA specify a given length of the school day?
4. Are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory (needs improvement)
performance evaluation?
5. Does the CBA allow for teachers to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation?
6. May the teacher grieve disciplinary action?
7. Is seniority the primary factor that determines the order of layoffs?
8. Do factors other than seniority determine the order of layoffs?
These selected provisions are used to guide the analysis related to selected provisions and
demographical indicators affecting Florida school districts.
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The study included 66 out of the 67 regular4 collective bargaining agreements from each
public school district in the state of Florida from 2015-2016. Sixty-one of the 67 collective
bargaining agreements were available on either the school districts’ website or the school
districts’ local teacher association website. Five of the 67 collective bargaining agreements were
obtained by calling and/or e-mailing either local teacher associations or school boards.
Surprisingly, one of the 67 collective bargaining agreements was not able to be obtained for this
study through any means. This study sought to answer the following research questions:
1. To what extent, if any, do collective bargaining agreement provisions differ according
to eight selected provisions among Florida public school district collective bargaining
agreements?
2. How does the presence or absence of the selected collective bargaining agreement
provisions impact demographical indicators of Florida school districts (i.e. district size,
district performance, district locale)?
This study uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches in the study making this study
mixed-method. The research design most closely resembles a QUAL-quan, mixed-method
model because qualitative data is considered more deeply and collected first, then quantitative
data is collected (Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2009). For the qualitative aspect of the research
design, content analysis was used to classify text into shared categories by extend beyond
counting words, comparing text and examining language intensely (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).

4

There are seven additional schools not governed by traditional CBAs: Four lab schools (operated by, Florida A &
M University, Florida Atlantic University, Florida State University, and the University of Florida), the Florida
School for the Death and Blind, Florida Virtual School, and Okeechobee Youth Development Center
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The type of content analysis specifically used is a summative content analysis which involves
counting and comparison of text (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).
From a broad perspective, to answer the research questions, eight desirable provisions
were identified based on Goldhaber, Lavery, & Theobald’s 2014 reserarch. The researcher
selected provisions that teachers possibly would be interested in because of their importance in
instructional collective bargaining agreements. More specifically, to answer research question
one, frequency statistics were computed for all eight desirable characteristics and reported to
identify the number and percentage of districts in which each respective contract provision was
present in the district’s CBAs. To answer research question two, crosstabulations were
conducted to determine how the presence of eight desirable collective bargaining agreement
elements varies according to the key variables of district size, district performance, and district
locale. The selected eight CBA provisions were disaggregated based on those key
aforementioned variables, resulting in three crosstabulation tables for each provision.

Discussion on Collective Bargaining Agreements and Florida Public School Districts
The first research question, to what extent are desirable collective bargaining agreement
elements present in Florida collective bargaining agreements, offers a qualitative insight into the
findings of this study. The findings from research question one indicates that collective
bargaining agreements vary in terms of the inclusion of desirable provisions for teachers. The
results show that none of the eight desirable provisions were present in all 66 collective
bargaining agreements. Even though bargaining varies widely from school district to school
district, local unions, school boards, and teachers will often compare their own contracts to other
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local union contracts (Lieberman, 1997). When unions set contract goals, they usually consider
what other local unions have achieved (Lieberman, 2000). The school board takes the union’s
proposal and then compares it to other school districts’ benefits. While none of the eight
provisions were present in all 66 CBAs, provision two (posting of certified vacancies) was
present in all but two CBAs and provision three (length of school day) was present in all but four
CBAs. Based on the data, these two provisions seemed to be the most commonly found ones
among the CBAs studied. Provisions two (posting of certificated vacancies) and three (length of
school day) show that there are some commonalties within the district CBAs.
Vachon and Ma (2015) multilevel intercept model places all collective bargaining items
into two main categories, economic and noneconomic based items. Provision one (release time
for negotiations) falls into the economic based category because allocation of funding is
involved. Provisions two through seven falls under the professional or noneconomic models of
unionism, which deal with issues such as job postings, teacher work day, evaluations, grievance,
and seniority which can affect the learning environment created by teachers (Vachon & Ma,
2015).
The first provision, does the district pay for release time for negotiations for union
members, is bargained through distributive bargaining. Distributive bargaining calls for
competitive negotiation between groups in hopes of obtaining limited resources by use of
persuasion (Walton & McKersie, 1991). The limited resource in provision one is funding and
the conflict is that both the union and the school board are trying to conserve their funding. The
conflict involved here is one of allocation of economic resource. Paying for release time can be
a disadvantage for the school district and can lead to pressure to settle contracts to avoid the cost
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of paying for additional time for substitute teachers to allow for a full bargaining team. The data
shows that the majority of districts (n=44, or 65.7%) do not pay for release time for negotiations.
It is interesting out of the eight provisions used in this study, the only economic-based one, this
first provision, was not included in such a high percentage of district CBAs. Looking at the
provision one from the perspective of the school board, granting release time to teachers would
mean loss of instructional time for students with their primary teacher (Lieberman, 2000). The
school boards that do agree to include provision one might do this because they would rather not
negotiate after school hours or on the weekend (Lieberman, 2000). Provision one contains all
but one collective bargaining theme (performance) making it is a complex issue. Provision one
raises the issue of being equitable and allowing educators the opportunity to take the time to
engage in a political process of negotiations and if the school will pay for the funds of the
substitute teacher. The decision to include provision one means taking away instructional time
from students. This may or may not be beneficial to students given the needed expertise of their
primary teacher. To that end, it may not be most appropriate to not allow the opportunity for
teachers to be involved in the political process of negotiation. Allowing provision one further
impacts the school’s economic resource by requiring a substitute teacher.
Provision two (posting of certified vacancies) was not present in only two out of the 66
CBAs, District 13 and District 14. In 2015, district 13 superintendent was working on a formula
for improving the school district’s grade by improving failing schools (Florida Department of
Education releases 2015 school grades, 2016). The superintendent replaced 80 percent of all
principals in the school district and recruited the best teachers (Florida Department of Education
releases 2015 school grades, 2016). It may be that district 13 required posting of certified
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vacancies but did not include provision two in the contract. District 14 presented their first ever
success plan for the 2015-2016 school year (Success Plan, 2015). District’s 14 success plan
identified four work projects, student success, employee success, culture of collaboration, and
financial stability (Success Plan, 2015). It seemed that District 14 was not concerned with new
employment but rather with current employee improvement which can be a reason that provision
two was not included in their CBAs. These may not be definitive reasons but may be used as
informed set of perspectives as to why it may not be.
Provision two fits into three of the six qualitative themed categories of opportunity,
politics, and equity. There are three emerging themes captured by the text for provision two
which are tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. opportunity, politics)
and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e. equity). Provision two asks if the district will become
competitive by posting opportunities for educators. The political influence is used when schools
are not wanting to post or limit their duration of the posted opportunities to avoid losing teachers.
Additionally, all of the collective bargaining agreements should have a system in place
for posting vacancies based on Florida law. Florida Statute §1012.05, teacher recruitment and
retention, states that a system shall be put in place for posting teacher vacancies. The amount of
days that a vacancy will be posted, mentioned in CBAs, ranged from three to seven days.
Almost all (98.3%) of CBAs contained provision three (Length of school day). One CBA
specified the “work week” as opposed to a “work day”.
Provision three (length of the school day) contains only two themes, time (processoriented approach) and performance (results-driven approach) because of the expectation set to
teachers for their work day. The length of time that is expected of the work day may or may not
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affect the performance of the teachers. Provision three contains the least amount of collective
bargaining themes.
Provision four, are there consequences for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory evaluation,
was almost even in the data set with (n=28 or 42.4%) not containing provision four and (n=38, or
57.6%) containing provision four. This result is particularly interesting considering that Florida
Statute §1012.34 (Personnel Evaluation and Procedure) states that an employee rated as
unsatisfactory shall be placed on performance probation for 90 calendar days. Senate Bill 736
brought about a new annual evaluation system for all teachers using four distinct levels of
effectiveness: highly effective, effective, needs improvement, and unsatisfactory (Senate Bill
736: How will it affect me?, 2016). Teachers rated as needs improvement or unsatisfactory will
receive no salary increase (§1012.22). Tenured teachers rated unsatisfactory two consecutive or
two of three years will be placed on an annual contact and then dismissed if not rated higher
(Senate Bill 736, 20 16). The Florida CBAs that mentioned consequences for receiving a
negative evaluation ranged from teachers needing immediate help to termination after continuous
ratings of unsatisfactory.
Provision four’s emerging themes, captured by the text, was tied with the broader theme
of the process-oriented approach (i.e. politics) and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e.
performance, equity). Provision four is concerned with the handling of performance (equity)
which ties into the politics of why a school might or might not have this provision. Provision
four is political because administration might question whether or not to issue a negative
evaluation out of fear of the conflict that may arise with the teacher. That political factor could
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potentially affect the performance of teachers if they are upset over the consequences for the
negative evaluation.
As for provision five, allowing for teacher to rebut or appeal a negative evaluation, the
data shows that the majority (n= 39 or 57.6%) do not allow teacher to rebut a negative
evaluation. There are three emerging themes captured by the text for provision five which was
tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. opportunity, politics) and the
results-oriented outcomes (i.e. performance, equity). Provision five asks if teachers would have
the equitable opportunity to appeal a negative performance evaluation. Politics is again involved
because challenges emerge whenever administration is approached in an adverse manor. The
opportunity to appeal and the politics involved to appeal can potentially affect the teacher’s
performance and feelings of equity depending on the outcome of the appeal. Provisions two
through seven are all noneconomic items with Provision five being present in the smallest
number of CBAs. The school board perspective is that administration will be more reluctant to
file a negative evaluation which would mean more time devoted to appeals (Lieberman, 2000).
One solution could be to allow teachers to append their own comments to a negative evaluation
rather than allowing provision five (Lieberman, 2000). Some CBAs states that the teacher has a
right to submit a written rebuttal which would become part of the evaluation records. However,
because a negative evaluation can lead to probation, salary stipend, and possible dismissal under
Senate Bill 736, it might only be equitable to allow for an appeal. Also, a negative evaluation
can affect a teacher’s chances of receiving a promotion.
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There are Florida Statutes for provision four, six, and seven yet none of those three
provisions are contained in all of the collective bargaining agreements. The data for provision
six, may a teacher grieve disciplinary action, is mixed with more CBAs containing provision six
(n= 37 or 56.1%) than not. Florida Statute § 1012.34 (Personnel Evaluation and Procedure)
states that an employee who wishes to contest the district’s school recommendation may request
for a hearing. Florida Statute § 1012.33 (Contracts with Instructional Staff) also states that any
such decision adverse to the employee may be appealed by the employee pursuant to § 120.68
(Judicial Review). Although Florida has these relevant statutes, only about half of the CBAs
mention that teachers may grieve disciplinary action. Provision six’s emerging themes captured
by the text was tied with opportunity, politics, performance and equity. The broader theme of
the process-oriented approach (i.e. opportunity, politics) and the results-oriented outcomes (i.e.
performance, equity) are involved. Provision six questions if a teacher would have the equitable
opportunity to grieve disciplinary action that was based on their performance. Politics is
involved because a debate is involved challenging administration.
Provision seven is concerned with whether seniority is the primary factor that determines
the order of layoffs. The data shows that (n=21 or 31.3%) use seniority as their primary factory
to determine layoffs. This is interesting considering Florida Statute §1012.33 states that if a
workforce reduction is needed, a district school board must retain employees at a school or in the
school district based upon education program needs and the performance evaluations of
employees within the affect program area. Per law, the employee with the lowest performance
evaluation must be the first to be released. Provision seven fits into two of the six themed
categories, time and politics. Provision seven’s qualitative emerging themes captured by the text
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was tied with the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. time, politics) and resultsoriented outcome (i.e. equity). Provision seven is concerned with if a teacher’s time spent in the
classroom determines the order of layoffs. Politics is involved because fair (equitable) way to
determine layoffs is debatable.
Provision eight is concerned with whether factors other than seniority determine the order
of layoffs. While seniority can be the primary factor and sometimes the only factor in
determining the order of layoffs, other factors can be considered. The researcher
noticed in the contracts that sometimes seniority is the only factor that matters while other
contracts have a list of factors that they consider with seniority being the most important factor.
The data shows that the majority of the districts (n=48 or 72.7%) have factors other than
seniority to determine the order of layoffs. Provision eight’s emerging themes, captured by the
text, were tied to the broader theme of the process-oriented approach (i.e. Politics) and the
results-oriented outcomes (i.e. equity). Provision eight asks what are other factors that determine
the order of layoffs. Provision eight is inherently political because the equitable way to deal with
the topic of layoffs is itself debatable.

Discussion on Collective Bargaining Agreements and Demographical Indicators
Research question number two, how does the presence of desirable collective bargaining
agreement elements vary according to district size, district performance, and district locale,
offers a quantitative insight into the findings of this study. As with Goldhaber and Theobald’s
(2014) study, the data in this study supports the authors research which found that spatial
relationship plays a major role in determining bargaining outcomes. The data illustrates that
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town locale CBAs contained the highest frequencies of desirable provisions. Districts with
lowest frequencies of desirable provisions were characterized by city and suburb locale. Strunk
and Reardon (2010) conclude that one district’s collective bargaining agreement influences the
terms and conditions in other districts bargaining especially when the districts have proximity to
each other. Districts with lowest frequencies of desirable provisions were characterized by
district grade D and the lowest enrollment quartile (1-4905 students). Districts with the highest
frequencies of desirable provisions were characterized by district grade C and enrollment
quartiles two (4,906-12,929 students) and three (12,930-43,039 students).
Provision one is concerned with whether the district pays for release time for negotiation
for union members. The data shows that Grade B district (n=14 or 37.8%) had the highest
percentage of CBAs that pay for release time for negotiation for union members. Grade D
districts had the highest percentage (n=1 or 100.0%) of CBAs that does not pay for release time
for negotiation. Florida Statute § 1008.36, Florida School Recognition Program, provides a
performance incentive for school receiving a grade of “A”, by demonstrating exemplary
improvement of at least one letter grade, or by sustaining the improvement the following year.
Performance grade D districts do not receive performance incentives which may be one of the
reasons why district grade D schools have the highest percentage of CBAs that do not pay for
release time for negotiation for union members.
Town CBAs had the highest percentage of CBAs (n=8 or 61.5%) where the district pays
for release time for negotiation. Rural locale had the highest percentage of CBAs (n=16 or
84.2%) that did not contain provision one. The U.S. Census Bureau reported that nationally,
rural Americans had a 4% lower median household income in 2015 than urban households
131

(USCB, 2015). Schools located in lower socioeconomic status (SES) locations such as a rural
locale may be one of the reasons why rural locale districts has the highest percentage of CBAs
that do not pay for release time for negotiation for union members. Schools in lower SES
locations may be underfunded because of lack of funding coming in from taxes (Silvers, 2008).
Quartile two (4,906-12,929) had the highest percentage of CBAs (N=8 or 47.1%) that
does pay for release time for negotiation for union members (provision one). Quartile three
(12,930-43,039) contained the highest percentage of CBAs (N=14 or 82.4%) that does not pay
for release time for negotiation for union members. The data does not necessarily agree with
what research tells us about district size. Larger districts typically have more money than
smaller unions (Moe, 2011), yet the data shows that quartile two has the highest percentage of
CBAs that pays for release time for union members. Smaller districts are more expensive to run
per capita than larger districts because usually small districts often have small schools, and small
schools can have higher overhead costs (Boser, 2013). Running a school for example with only
100 students is more expensive than one with 600 students because of overhead (Boser, 2013).
Provision two asks, do the CBAs require that districts post all certified vacancies/make
them available to teachers in the district? Districts with A and B grades contain the only two
CBAs that do not require the district to post all certified vacancies. Except for only two (7.1%)
suburban CBAs, all the locale CBAs require the district to post all certified vacancies. Quartile
three (12,930-43,039) and four (43,040-35,7311) contain the only two CBAs that do not require
the district to post all certified vacancies. Investment in human capital by attracting and
developing strong employees can improve organizational performance (Crook, 2011). Strategic
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recruitment increases overall teacher quality yet on average, 94% of districts post job openings
on their district website (Konoske-Graf, Partelow, & Benner, 2016).
Provision three asks, does the CBAs specify the given length of the school day? The Bgrade district (n=3 or 8.1%) and C-grade district (n=1 or 5.9%) contained the only 4 CBAs that
did not specify the given length of the school or teacher work day. For locale, town had 100% of
CBAs that contained provision three. For enrollment, quartile two and three had the only four
CBAs that did not contain provision three.
For provision four, the results were rather uniform throughout with only one contract in
grade D (n=1, 100%) not having a consequence for receiving a negative/unsatisfactory
evaluation. As far as locale, city (n= 4, 66.7%) had the highest percentage of CBAs containing
provision four. For enrollment, fourth quartile (n=12, 70.6%) contained the highest percentage
of CBAs containing provision four.
Provision five asks, does the collective bargaining agreement allow for teachers to rebut
or appeal a negative evaluation? According to district grade, grade C had the most CBAs (n=12,
70.6%) that contained provision five. District grade D had only one contract (100%) that did not
contain provision five. For enrollment, Quartile one (73.3%) had the highest percentage of
CBAs and quartile two (52.9%) had the least CBAs that contained provision five.
Regarding Provision six, may a teacher grieve disciplinary action, grade C school
districts (n=11, 64.7%) had the highest percentage of CBAs that contained this provision.
School district grade D (n=1, 100%) had one CBA that did not have provision six making it the
highest percentage of CBAs that did not contain provision six. Suburban locale (n=19, 67.9%)
had the highest percentage of CBAs that contained provision six. City (n=4, 66.7%) had the
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highest percentage that did not contain provision six. For enrollment, the 4th quartile (n=11,
64.7%) had the highest percentage of CBAs containing provision six. Quartile one (n=9, 60%)
had the highest percentage that did not contain provision six.
Provision seven is concerned with whether seniority is the primary factor that determines
the order of layoffs. The data shows that grade C districts (n=11, 64.7%) CBAs had the highest
percentage of CBAs that contain provision seven. The one and only D school district CBA did
not contain provision seven giving it the highest percentage of CBAs that did not contain
provision seven. Rural school district (n=1, 36.8%) and quartile three (n=10, 58.8%) contained
the highest percentage of CBAs that contain provision seven. Suburban (n=20, 71.4%) and
second quartile (n=14, 82.4%) contained the highest percentage of CBAs that do not contain
provision seven.
Provision eight asks, do factors other than seniority determine the order of layoffs?
CBAs in school district grade A (n=11, 100%) and D (n=1, 100%) have all of their CBAs
containing provision eight. For locale, rural (n=15, 76.9%) CBAs contain the highest percentage
of CBAs that contain provision eight. For enrollment, quartile two (n=13, 76.5%) contains the
highest percentage of CBA’s that contain provision eight.

Implications for Practice
Collective bargaining in education has a profound impact on schools because of the
difference that collective bargaining agreements can make with teachers regarding the conditions
of their employment, which subsequently impacts the school culture and relationships between
the school and school district. Collective bargaining in education has a profound impact on
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schools. Regarding the conditions of their employment, the difference that collective bargaining
agreements make with teachers is found within the school culture and the types of relationships
that emerge within schools and between school districts. Collective bargaining has served as a
powerful tool used by teacher unions to create better working conditions for their members by
allowing working salaries, working conditions, benefits, and other aspects of rights for workers
to be improved through negotiation (Hornick-Lockard, 2015; Lieberman, 1997). From a
qualitative perspective, contractual terminology used in collective bargaining agreements varies
widely. It is important to determine the different patterns of wording for each contractual issue.
For example, provision one (release time for negotiation) in a CBA can be categorized under
“released time”, “union rights,” “leave of absence,” “grievance procedure,” or “miscellaneous”
to cite just a few examples. Content analysis classifies a CBA’s text into shared categories
making it easier to find contractual provisions. From a quantitative perspective, once the data
was analyzed qualitatively, correlations were formed between the CBA’s characteristics (i.e.
district size, district performance, and district locale) and the provisions. This information
allows persons interested in CBAs to study districts that contain the most desirable CBA
provisions in their contracts in order to understand the dynamics of these contracts.
Persons interested in researching collective bargaining agreements find the evidence of
links between collective bargaining agreements and school district characteristics and CBA
themes useful. People who might be interested include CBA negotiating parties (i.e. school
board, teacher unions), policymakers, politicians, teachers, researchers, and parents. Also, those
interested in school reform and would like more information on the similarities and unique
aspects and content of Florida CBAs would find this study useful. The research examined what
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influenced the provisions that are found in CBAs and will guide interested persons to examine
CBAs with desirable provisions using the results of this study.
The results of this study provide insight into the terms and conditions of collective
bargaining agreements in Florida, thereby providing Florida school districts with information to
construct the best possible competitive contracts in the future, which would then attract top talent
as well as to protect the best interests of their districts and all parties.

Recommendation for Further Research
Collective bargaining is a newer topic of research of which we know little about (Anzia
& Moe, 2014; Lewin, Keefe, & Kochan, 2012). The recommendations for further study
presented in this section can expand upon the current study.
One possible future study could be to research the impact that collective bargaining has
on Florida public school education. This research could potentially improve education for
students, and working conditions for teachers, by giving recommendations on additional items to
include in a collective bargaining agreement. The study could be replicated using different
provisions than the eight selected and/or using charter schools.
Another possible future study could answer the question, what factors influence the
provisions that end up in these Florida collective bargaining agreements? Goldhaber and
Theobald (2014) asked this question with their study on collective bargaining agreements but it
would be useful to replicate this study in Florida. It is less common to find literature that
questions union members’ strengths in impacting important decisions which affect collective
bargaining agreements.
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A possible future study could use Strunk and Reardon’s (2010) measure of contract
restrictiveness to study Florida union member’s strength. This study could help in understanding
provision frequencies in Florida collective bargaining agreements. Strunk and Reardon (2010)
use collective bargaining agreements negotiated between unions and school boards to determine
union strength compared to the employer. Contracts that contain outcomes that are more unionfriendly indicated that those unions are stronger than management (Strunk & Reardon, 2010). An
understanding of the mind frame that the school board and the union have when coming to the
negotiation table helps in understanding how negotiations are handled. Other studies might
consider the role of the legislative-funded schools (i.e. school choice and the legislative funded,
Florida Virtual Schools) and how collective bargaining agreements influence the administrative
and governance within those state funded efforts.
Continuous research on this new literature will help bring clarity and consistency to
collective bargaining studies. Further research on teacher collective bargaining can only provide
more information for unions interested in improving schools (Vachon & Ma, 2015).

Conclusions from the Research Study
The findings of this study expanded upon the work of Goldhaber, Lavery, and Theobald
(2014). As with Goldhaber and Theobald (2014) study, the data in this study supports the
author’s research which found that spatial relationship plays a role in determining bargaining
outcomes. The data from research question two illustrates that town locale CBAs contained the
highest frequencies of desirable provisions. Districts with lowest frequencies of desirable
provisions were characterized by city and suburb locale.
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The findings resulting from research question one indicates that collective bargaining
agreements vary in terms of the inclusion of desirable provisions for teachers. The results show
that none of the eight desirable provisions were present in all 66 collective bargaining
agreements. This shows that state teachers association do not have a great deal of influence on
local unions to implement a state-wide provision. The unions and school districts seem to have
negotiated contracts to address their own local needs and interests. The most agreed upon
provisions seemed to be provision two (posting of certificated vacancies) and three (length of
school day), showing that there are some commonalties within the district CBAs. The provisions
that had a corresponding Florida State Statute did not necessarily have provision listed in the
collective bargaining agreements.
The process-oriented approach theme of politics was present in all but one CBA making
politics the theme with the most CBAs. The results-driven outcome theme of equity was present
in all but two collective bargaining agreements making equity the theme with the most CBAs for
results-driven outcomes. Provision one contained the most themes, having all but one theme
(performance). Provision seven contained the least number of themes having only time and
politics, two process-oriented approach themes.
In order to construct the best possible competitive contracts in the future, more
consistency among the CBAs is needed. The provisions that have a Florida State statute should
be included in all of the CBAs or, at least have a reference to the Florida Statute number as some
contracts provided. The evidence of the links between collective bargaining agreements and
school district characteristics can be used as a reference for exploring how to construct the best
possible competitive contracts in the future.
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